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Why Twombly Is Good Law (But Poorly Drafted) and
Iqbal Will Be Overturned†
LUKE MEIER∗
The conventional wisdom with regard to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal is that these two cases work
together to usher in a new era of pleading. This reading of the cases, however, is
wrong. In reality, Twombly was a valid application of the uncontroversial
principle that a complaint must describe the real-world events on which the suit is
based with some degree of factual specificity. The Iqbal opinion, unfortunately,
mangled this concept by applying it to a complaint that described the real-world
events on which the suit was based with sufficient factual specificity. Thus, rather
than working in conjunction with each other, the Twombly and Iqbal cases are
actually pulling in opposite directions. This Article explores this issue. It concludes
that this tension will ultimately be resolved in favor of the approach in Twombly.
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INTRODUCTION
In the attempt to decipher what is required to plead a claim for relief in federal
court after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly1 and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,2 commentators have usually combined these two cases as being
part of the same “revolution” in pleading.3 The Iqbal case is often credited for
clearing up lingering questions regarding the scope of the “plausibility” analysis
introduced in Twombly.4 Apart from this issue, however, Twombly and Iqbal have
usually been discussed as a cohesive pair. They have been jointly criticized.5
Occasionally, they have been jointly praised.6
The tendency to view Twombly and Iqbal as a collective unit has, unfortunately,
interfered with efforts to understand pleading doctrine. The cases have dissimilar

1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
3. See, e.g., Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost
of False Positive Error, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1 (2010) (“Iqbal and Twombly
introduced a new standard for pleading federal claims . . . .”); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen
C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 823 (2010)
(crediting both Twombly and Iqbal for destabilizing the entire system of civil litigation);
Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 54 (2010) (“Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal together have changed the old notice
pleading standard to a new ‘plausibility’ regime based primarily on pleading nonconclusory
facts.”); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss
Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 15 (2010) (stating that in Iqbal
and Twombly “the Supreme Court created a new standard for granting motions to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6)”). But see Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised:
A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 849 (2010) (“Iqbal screens
lawsuits more aggressively than Twombly, and does so without adequate consideration of the
policy stakes.”).
4. See Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
473, 478–81 (2010) (explaining that the Iqbal opinion clarifies that Twombly cannot be
limited solely to the antitrust context); The Honorable John P. Sullivan, Twombly and Iqbal:
The Latest Retreat from Notice Pleading, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 49–50 (2009) (same).
5. See Michael R. Huston, Note, Pleading with Congress to Resist the Urge to
Overrule Twombly and Iqbal, 109 MICH. L. REV. 415 (2010) (documenting the widespread
academic criticism of Twombly and Iqbal and the legislative proposals introduced in
Congress which would “overrule” the decisions); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to
Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1,
2 (2010) (articulating the view that “Twombly and Iqbal have destabilized both the pleading
and the motion-to-dismiss practices” and that “important values of civil litigation are in
jeopardy”); see also Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293,
1299 (2010) (“At best, Twombly and Iqbal appear to be result-oriented decisions designed to
terminate at the earliest possible stage lawsuits that struck the majorities as undesirable.”).
6. See Stephen R. Brown, Reconstructing Pleading: Twombly, Iqbal, and the Limited
Role of the Plausibility Inquiry, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1265, 1267 (2010) (arguing that much of
the criticism regarding Twombly and Iqbal is “unjustified”); Adam McDonell Moline,
Nineteenth-Century Principles for Twenty-First Century Pleading, 60 EMORY L.J. 159, 159
(2010) (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal “better reflect the original meaning of the Federal
Rules than the caselaw the Court discarded”).
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analytical foundations. In short, the Twombly decision can be justified as merely an
application of preexisting principles regarding pleading; the Iqbal case, however,
was wrongly decided and is destined to be overruled. To jointly criticize both
opinions is to throw the baby (Twombly) out with the bathwater (Iqbal); to jointly
praise both opinions is to miss how dirty the bath water is in which the baby is
sitting. Until Twombly and Iqbal are decoupled and considered as separate entities,
pleading jurisprudence will continue in a state of disarray.
It is not necessarily surprising that academic commentators have treated
Twombly and Iqbal as one and the same. The Court’s Iqbal opinion reads as if all
that was required in Iqbal was a simple application of the Twombly decision. It is
likely that the Iqbal Court even thought as much. The underlying problem is the
Twombly opinion.
The Twombly opinion is muddled on three critical points. All three of these
points are necessary to an understanding of the Twombly case. The inarticulate
manner in which these points were discussed in Twombly is largely responsible for
the current confusion regarding pleading doctrine; it is also the source of the
erroneous decision in Iqbal. Because of the ambiguity in the Twombly opinion, the
Iqbal Court interpreted it in a manner that was inconsistent with prior Supreme
Court precedent.
First, the Twombly opinion does a poor job of pinpointing the critical defect in
the plaintiffs’ complaint, which was the complete lack of factual specificity
provided in the complaint regarding the event on which the defendants’ liability
was premised.7 Scholars have often failed to appreciate that Twombly was a case
about the factual specificity, or the lack thereof, in the plaintiffs’ complaint.8 The
Iqbal Court appears to have made this same mistake.9
Second, the Twombly opinion is unclear as to how the “plausibility” analysis,
which was introduced in Twombly, relates to the question of factual specificity.10 It
is tempting to interpret the Twombly opinion such that plausibility is a measure for
factual specificity. Under this reading, a complaint has sufficient factual specificity
when it includes enough factual detail to be plausible. As such, plausibility is a
requirement that every civil complaint filed in federal court must meet. The better
reading of Twombly, however, is that the plausibility analysis is required only when
the factual specificity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (“Rule 8”)
have not been met. Pursuant to this understanding, factual specificity serves as a
trigger for the plausibility analysis: only when the complaint has not been drafted
with sufficient factual specificity does the plausibility analysis become necessary.
This reading of Twombly reconciles the case with existing pleading doctrine.
However, under this reading, Twombly still serves as an incredibly important case
of first impression: Twombly is the first Supreme Court opinion to determine that

7. See infra Part II.
8. For instance, Professor Steinman’s influential article, Plain Pleading, does not
include the term “factual specificity”; based on this omission and the overall focus of
Steinman’s article, it is fair to conclude that he does not believe that the question of factual
specificity was at the heart of Twombly and Iqbal. See generally Steinman, supra note 5.
9. See infra Part IV.B.
10. See infra Part III.C.
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the factual specificity standard of Rule 8 had not been met, and it instructs lower
courts on how to proceed in this event—by conducting the plausibility analysis.
This leads to the third point on which the Twombly opinion is equally vague:
What is the test for factual specificity that triggers the plausibility analysis? The
Iqbal Court (as well as most commentators) focused on the portion of the Twombly
opinion discussing the “conclusory” nature of the conspiracy allegations in that
case.11 Thus, in Iqbal, the Court proceeded to a plausibility analysis because the
allegations of discriminatory intent in that case were “conclusory.”12 It makes no
sense, however, for the plausibility analysis to be triggered by the existence of
conclusory allegations. Whether an allegation is conclusory is different than
whether the allegation is factually specific.13 The Twombly complaint involved a
conclusory allegation that was not factually specific;14 the Iqbal complaint, on the
other hand, involved a conclusory allegation that was factually specific.15 By
conflating the factual specificity of an allegation with whether that allegation is
conclusory, the Twombly opinion occasioned the Iqbal decision in which the
plaintiffs’ complaint was dismissed despite having been drafted with as much
factual specificity as possible.16
Once the confusion stemming from the jumbled Twombly opinion is sorted out,
the Iqbal decision stands out as an eyesore within pleading jurisprudence. It is
flatly inconsistent with Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,17 a unanimous decision by the
Supreme Court decided only seven years prior to Iqbal. The Swierkiewicz decision
was not overruled, nor even mentioned, in the Iqbal opinion. In addition, the
original understanding of Rule 8, as pronounced in Conley v. Gibson,18 would not
have required that a plaintiff such as Iqbal even allege the defendants’
discriminatory intent, let alone demonstrate that allegation’s “plausibility.”
The organization of this article is as follows: Part I provides a brief history of
pleading theory within the United States and a reexamination of the Conley
decision. Part II demonstrates that Twombly was a case in which the factual
specificity of the complaint was at issue. Part III explores the different ways in
which Twombly’s plausibility analysis might relate to factual specificity,
concluding that plausibility is triggered only when a complaint lacks factual
specificity. Part IV argues that the Iqbal Court’s fundamental error was to apply the
plausibility analysis because of the existence of the conclusory allegation.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See infra Part IV.B.
See id.
Infra Part IV.D.
Id.
Id.
See id.
534 U.S. 506 (2002).
355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Pleading Eras
To best understand Twombly and Iqbal, it is helpful to briefly revisit the history
of pleading within the United States and how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
fit into that story. This history has been thoroughly addressed in contemporary
scholarship19 and need not be recounted here in great detail. A cursory recap,
however, should prove fruitful to the topics discussed in this paper.
The pleading system inherited from English common law, and used initially by
American courts, required a plaintiff to sue on a particular writ.20 A writ was a
recognized legal right to a particular legal remedy under certain factual
circumstances.21 Under the common law form of pleading, it was important that the
complaint clearly identify the writ being sued upon.22 Moreover, each lawsuit could
involve only one writ.23
This system forced litigants to frame their disputes within the confines of
established legal principles.24 But it was mostly ineffective in achieving clarity

19. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading Standards on
to Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261, 265–68 (2009) (detailing history of
pleading from the common law to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Moline, supra note
6, at 163–73 (same); Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the
Modern World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly &
Iqbal, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1111–21 (2010) (same); Sullivan, supra note 4, at
8–14 (same).
20. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 5.1, at 252 (4th ed. 2005) (“At common law the entire procedure system was
inextricably interwoven with what was called the writ system.”); SUZANNA SHERRY & JAY
TIDMARSH, CIVIL PROCEDURE: ESSENTIALS 24 (2007) (“Almost all the newly independent
states initially adopted the English system, complete with the writ and pleading
regime . . . .”); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 337 (7th ed. 2008) (“Early common
law reflected great concern about whether the claim was one of the 30-some actions. . . . As
a result, common law pleaders had to recite carefully one of the formulas (writs) recognized
by those courts.” (emphasis in original)).
21. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 8 (“Each writ developed its own procedural, factual,
and evidentiary requirements and provided specific and unique remedies.”); Note, The Right
to Jury Trial in Enforcement Actions Under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 737, 747 (1983) (explaining that “common law writs combined both rights and
remedies into a ‘single form of action’”).
22. See RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.2 (2d ed. 2009) (explaining the
necessity of suing on a particular writ at common law); SHERRY & TIDMARSH, supra note 20,
at 19–20 (same).
23. See DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, WHAT SHALL BE DONE WITH THE PRACTICE OF THE
COURTS? (Jan. 1, 1847), reprinted in 1 SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF
DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 226, 237 (A. P. Sprague ed., 1884) (“A mistake in the form of the
action is generally fatal to the case.”); Sullivan, supra note 4, at 9–10 (“The common law
judges, including Blackstone, were more concerned that the correct writ was chosen than
whether a plaintiff could recover damages for an injury.”).
24. See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE P LEADING § 4, at 14 (2d
ed. 1947) (“The process of issuing writs came to be strictly limited to cases where precedents
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between the litigants as to their competing version of the events that had led to the
dispute. Under the common law writ-based pleadings, the factual predicate of the
dispute (each party’s version of the “story” of the case) was a secondary concern.25
Because the plaintiff might not have to present her version of the real, disputed
facts in the initial writ, a party’s factual contentions could be unknown until trial.26
As the nineteenth century proceeded, the common law writ system of pleading
was gradually replaced by “code pleading.”27 An important event in this
transformation was the development of New York’s “Field Code” of pleading, as
drafted by legal reformer David Dudley Field.28 The code theory of pleading
represented a fundamental shift in what was required from a complaint at the outset
of a case.29 While the common law system of pleading required the plaintiff to
identify the basis of the legal doctrine on which relief was sought, the code theory
of pleading instead required a plaintiff to tell the “story” of the case from her
perspective.30
Numerous factors influenced the shift from common law writ pleading to code
pleading,31 but the change was consistent with fundamental jurisprudential shifts
during this time period regarding the nature of law and the role of a judge in
deciding a case. The common law writ theory of pleading was a good fit for the
existed, so that a litigant had to bring his claim within the limits set by some former
precedent.”); Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV.
777, 793 (2004) (noting that common law pleading was reluctant to recognize relief for
“novel claims”); see also SHERRY & TIDMARSH, supra note 20, at 20–21 (explaining that the
writ system limited the types of relief that could be awarded); cf. ROBERT WYNES MILLAR,
CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 5–6 (1952) (explaining
the gradual trend from “rigidity to flexibility” within the history of procedure).
25. See YEAZELL, supra note 20, at 337 (explaining that it was necessary to include the
allegation required for the writ sued upon but that these allegations might reveal little about
the underlying factual dispute between the litigants).
26. See id. (“[L]itigants could occasionally stumble into trial having little idea what the
contested issues would be.”); SHERRY & TIDMARSH, supra note 20, at 21 (explaining that
under the writ system of pleading “there was almost no way for the parties to ferret out facts
unless they paid for an investigation”).
27. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 20–21 (2d ed. 2009) (describing the
“code pleading” reform of American pleading); RICHARD L. MARCUS, MARTIN H. REDISH,
EWARD F. SHERMAN & JAMES E. PFANDER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 118
(5th ed. 2009) (same).
28. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 340 (1973) (explaining
the development and importance of the Field Code).
29. See id. (“Stylistically, no greater affront to the common-law tradition can be
imagined than the 1848 code. . . . The substance of the Field Code was almost as daring as
its style. . . . [T]his was the death sentence of common-law pleading.”).
30. See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 11, at 29
(1928) (“[C]ode pleading may be referred to as fact pleading, in view of the great emphasis
placed under the codes upon getting the facts stated.”) (emphasis in original); CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 5 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202, at 91
(3d ed. 2004) (“Under the codes the emphasis was placed on developing the facts through
the pleadings.”).
31. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 344–46 (arguing that the pleading reform was
supported by commercial interests desiring a more predictable procedural context for the
resolution of disputes).
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natural law conception of law, which permeated the English common law that had
been received in America.32 Under natural law theory, the common law was
nothing more than an application of self-evident principles that could be deduced
from prior cases and simple logic.33 The role of a judge, then, was to ascertain the
relevant authority and guiding principles that would control the dispute.34 This topdown, authority-based conception of law was well served by a pleading doctrine
that required the plaintiff to identify the controlling law at the outset.
The emergence of code pleading coincided with a rejection of natural law
principles in favor of a more instrumental view of the common law and the role of
judges.35 Under this instrumental view, the common law was a product of human
will (as opposed to natural law principles) and thus a mechanism or tool by which
to achieve particular policy objectives.36 The role of the judge, then, was to
understand how a specific factual dispute implicated larger policy concerns.37
Obviously, a pleading regime that elevated the importance of the factual context of
the dispute over legal doctrine was a natural fit with this new instrumental view of
the law and the role of judges. It was important for judges to understand the factual
context in order to appreciate the relevant policy issues at stake. Legal doctrine was
less important during this time period, as judges generally felt less constrained by
precedent and freer to craft “new” rules of decision.38

32. See Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence:
The Onset of Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1397 (1997) (“American jurisprudents
readily accepted Blackstone’s natural law orientation.”); Barbara A. Singer, The Reason of
the Common Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 797, 799–807 (1983) (discussing the natural law
foundation of English common law).
33. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860
(1977) (“In short, common law doctrines were derived from natural principles of justice,
statutes were acts of will; common law rules were discovered, statutes were made.”); id. at 4
(“The generation of Americans who made the American Revolution had little difficulty in
conceiving of the common law as a known and determinate body of legal doctrine.”).
34. See id. at 8 (“The equation of common law with a fixed, customary standard meant
that judges conceived of their role as merely that of discovering and applying preexisting
legal rules.”).
35. See id. at 16–30 (describing the emergence of an instrumental view of the common
law during the first half of the nineteenth century).
36. See id. at 21–23 (explaining the process by which the instrumental view of the
common law displaced the natural law conception of the common law).
37. See id. at 22–23 (portraying the emerging view among judges during this time as
adhering to the “view that they had been given a popular charter to mold legal doctrine
according to broad conceptions of public policy”).
38. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. 1805) (“[O]ur decision should have in
view the greatest possible encouragement to the destruction of an animal, so cunning and
ruthless in his career . . . . Whatever Justinian may have thought of the matter, it must be
recollected that his code was compiled many hundred years ago, and it would be very hard
indeed, at the distance of so many centuries, not to have a right to establish a rule for
ourselves . . . . [T]empora mutantur; and if men themselves change with the times, why
should not the laws undergo an alteration?”) (Livingston, J., dissenting); see HORWITZ, supra
note 33, at 24–26 (describing an emerging resistance to “the colonial subservience to
precedent” and a willingness to create new rules justified on “functional terms”).
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The discrepancy between the fact-based regime of code pleading and the
doctrine-based regime of common law pleading can be thought of as representing
two fundamental ways of thinking—and talking about—the law. Was Palsgraf39 a
case about proximate cause and duty in a negligence claim? Or, was Palsgraf a
story about an exploding package of dynamite, tipped scales, and a severely injured
plaintiff? Both descriptions of the case are accurate and merely represent different
ways of thinking about—and discussing—the law. The first description of Palsgraf
describes the case in doctrinal terms, while the second describes the case in terms
of a factual story. The difference between common law pleading and code pleading
can be understood according to these two ways of thinking about law: common law
pleading emphasized doctrine, while code pleading emphasized real-world facts.
Even with the shift to a system of fact-based pleading during the instrumental
period in American jurisprudence, however, legal doctrine never became
unnecessary or irrelevant. Although a judge during the instrumental period might
have been more inclined to narrowly read precedent or to create new legal rights, in
most run-of-the-mill cases, the story told by the plaintiff would have to “fit” within
a recognized fact pattern for which legal relief was recognized.40 Because the
plaintiff’s complaint under code pleading was fact-driven, it was necessary to
match the story told by the plaintiff to a recognized cause of action under existing
law. Of course, this inquiry is always necessary in any legal system, but during the
common law system of writ pleading, this process would not often be conducted
solely from the initial complaint. Because the common law writ system required the
plaintiff to plead the writ, or recognized cause of action, at the outset of the case,
with scant attention to factual underpinnings, the process of matching facts to law
usually occurred after the initial writ was filed by the plaintiff; usually, this was
done through a system of back-and-forward pleading between the litigants or at
trial.41 Under code pleading, however, with the plaintiff’s version of the facts
included in the complaint, it was possible to do an initial screening of existing law

39. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928).
40. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 8–9 (2008) (explaining that judges
must often consult “other sources of judgment” than “conventional legal texts” but that this
is necessary only “occasional[ly]”).
41. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 1202, at 90 (“At common law there was a
generally held belief in the efficacy of pleadings. The whole grand scheme was premised on
the assumption that by proceeding through a maze of rigid, and often numerous, stages of
denial, avoidance, or demurrer, eventually the dispute would be reduced to a single issue of
law or fact that would dispose of the case.”); Charles E. Clark, The Complaint in Code
Pleading, 35 YALE L.J. 259, 259 (1926) (“It is true that the common law declaration
contained allegations which set forth the pleader's cause in a general way at least; but the
emphasis under the common law system of pleading was placed, not so much on getting the
facts on record, but rather upon forcing the opposing parties by their successive pleadings to
arrive at a single definite issue.”). By filing a demurrer, a defendant could assert that the
plaintiff had not pled facts that entitled the plaintiff to recovery. MARCUS ET AL., supra note
27, at 117. But this was a risky litigation strategy for a defendant: “If defendant filed a
general demurrer, for example, that might put the case at issue; if the demurrer were not
sustained the plaintiff could win the case because the defendant chose the wrong point to
fight.” Id.
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to see if the plaintiff’s story was recognized as actionable under existing legal
doctrine.42
The ability of a judge to match facts to legal doctrine at the pleadings stage
depends, in part, upon the specificity with which the plaintiff, in her complaint, has
recounted the facts that prompted the dispute. The more specificity included by the
plaintiff, the easier it is for a court to adjudge whether the plaintiff has a right to
recovery under existing law.43 For instance, a complaint that describes the
formation and breach of a contract to deliver widgets is presumptively actionable.44
However, if the complaint more specifically describes the defendant as a thirteenyear-old defendant, the claim is not actionable under the legal rule that minors
cannot enter into binding contracts.45
The question of the factual specificity required under code pleading for a
plaintiff’s complaint is a history that has been exhaustively recounted and need not
be replicated here.46 While it is a complicated topic, it is safe to make the general
observation that as code pleading developed in the late nineteenth century, some
courts began to require more and more factual specificity from the plaintiff in her
complaint.47
This pleading trend towards requiring more factual specificity can again be
understood in terms of deeper jurisprudential shifts. The formalist jurisprudential
era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was a reaction to the
instrumental period in American jurisprudence.48 As with the natural law
conception inherited from English common law, the focus during the formalist era
again swung towards the idea of law as a top-down process in which legal
precedent was more important.49 Although the formalist era often substituted a

42. See Michael Moffitt, Pleadings in the Age of Settlement, 80 IND. L.J. 727, 764–65
(2005) (describing demurrer practice under code pleading).
43. See YEAZELL, supra note 20, at 357 (“The more detail required, the greater the
likelihood that a court can sort strong from weak cases at an earlier stage.”).
44. See Kabehie v. Zoland, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 728 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
(discussing elements of a claim for breach of contract).
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981) (“Unless a statute provides
otherwise, a natural person has the capacity to incur only voidable contractual duties until
the beginning of the day before the person's eighteenth birthday.”).
46. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 41, at 259–70 (describing factual specificity required
under Code pleading); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986) (recounting history of factual
specificity required under Code pleading era); Moline, supra note 6, at 166–69 (same).
47. Courts would sometimes penalize a plaintiff by alleging facts too specifically, as
well. See Moline, supra note 6, at 167–68 (“[J]udges perverted Field’s fact pleading into a
doctrine of ‘ultimate facts,’ as distinguished from ‘conclusions of law’ (facts alleged too
generally) and ‘evidentiary facts’ (facts alleged too specifically).”).
48. See William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of
Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 516–20 (1974)
(discussing many different theories as to the relationship between the instrumental period
and the formalist period but assuming that some relationship must exist).
49. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 37–39
(1960) (describing the emphasis on precedent and legal doctrine during the formalist era in
American jurisprudence); Nelson, supra note 48, at 516 (“In talking about a shift from

718

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 87:709

“scientific” approach to ascertaining controlling legal authority instead of the “selfevidence” principles of natural law,50 the effect was the same in that judges
generally felt more constrained by precedent and less able to react to the particular
facts of a case to achieve justice or promote particular policies.51 The trend under
code pleading to sometimes require more specificity, then, fits with the increased
importance of legal doctrine and precedent towards the close of the nineteenth
century. By requiring a plaintiff to plead her case with more specificity, the
relevant legal rules could be more quickly and accurately ascertained and applied.
Code pleading had arisen as a reaction to the doctrine-heavy approach of
common law pleading. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were also a reaction
to the pleading regime of the formalist era that it ultimately replaced.52 The Federal
Rules accepted the fact-centric approach of code pleading; both code pleading and
the Federal Rules proceed from the same starting assumption, which is that the
primary objective of a complaint is for the plaintiff to present her version of the
factual predicate on which the liability of the defendant is based.53 However, the
Federal Rules were drafted with the clear objective that less factual specificity be
required than what had sometimes been mandated by judges under code pleading.54
This is evident from the text of Rule 8,55 the statements of those who drafted the

instrumentalism to formalism . . . we are talking about a shift in the style of judicial
reasoning in individual cases—a shift from a style in which judges explicitly asked
themselves whether a proposed rule would promote economic growth to a style in which
judges asked whether a proposed rule was consistent with an existing body of doctrine.”).
50. See C.C. LANGDELL, SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at viii (1879)
(“Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have such a
mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and certainty to the evertangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer.”); David Dudley Field, The
Magnitude and Importance of Legal Science (Sept. 21, 1859), in 2 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 658, 659 (Steven Sheppard ed., 1999) (“The science of
the law embraces therefore all the rules recognized and enforced by the State . . . .”).
51. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 49, at 38 (describing the formalist-era momentum
towards the idea that “the rules of law . . . decide the cases” and that policy considerations
were “not for the courts”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8
HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1894) (“[J]udges do not like to discuss questions of policy, or to put a
decision in terms upon their views as law-makers . . . .”).
52. See ISSACHAROFF, supra note 27, at 21 (“The Rules were also intended to resolve the
many problems of the common law and state code approaches to the pleading process.”);
YEAZELL, supra note 20, at 357 (“[T]he Rules seek to avoid [the problems associated with
the factual specificity requirements under Code pleading] with their ‘short, plain statement’
requirement.”).
53. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 20, §§ 5.5–.7 at 262–67 (describing the
relationship between common law pleading, code pleading, and pleading under the Federal
Rules); Moline, supra note 6, at 163–76 (same).
54. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 1202, at 93 (“Federal civil pleadings differ
from the ‘fact pleading’ of the codes principally in the degree of generality with which the
elements of the claim may be stated.”).
55. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring only a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); see also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 20,
§ 5.7, at 267 (comparing the language of Rule 8(a)(2) with the Code requirement of a
“statement of facts constituting a cause of action”).
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Rules,56 and also from the structure of the Rules themselves, which provided
generous discovery provisions requiring the parties to provide relevant information
as to the facts of the case.57
As with the other instances of shifts in pleading theory, the change represented
by the Federal Rules can also be understood within the context of larger trends. The
Rules were promulgated in 1938 during the jurisprudential shift towards “legal
realism.”58 Indeed, legal realists were a driving force behind the reform movement
that produced the Federal Rules.59 Legal realists held different tenets and offered
varying perspectives,60 but one underlying theme of all legal realists was an attack
on the sanctity of case-law precedent—particularly, precedents established during
the more conservative formalist era.61 The code pleading era had demonstrated that
requiring a plaintiff to plead with more specificity in her complaint facilitated the
application of legal doctrine early in a dispute.62 If less specificity was going to be
required under the Rules, then, the application of controlling legal doctrine would
less often be possible solely from the plaintiff’s complaint. This suited legal realists
fine, as they generally doubted the efficacy of legal precedent in the first place and

56. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL RULES, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
18–19 (1955) (“The intent and effect of the rules is to permit the claim to be stated in general
terms . . . .”).
57. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (describing the discovery tools available under
the Federal Rules).
58. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1222–24 (1931) (“FERMENT is abroad in the law.”); id. at 1224
(“Speak, if you will, of a ‘realistic jurisprudence.’”); Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist
Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 697 (1931) (“Hence I approach the subject of the call
for a realist jurisprudence . . . .”).
59. See SHERRY & TIDMARSH, supra note 20, 26–28 (detailing the early efforts of realist
Roscoe Pound towards procedural reform).
60. Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial) Defense of Legal Formalism, 36 IND.
L. REV. 57, 59 (2003) (“[L]egal realism was less a coherent school of thought than a set of
somewhat diverse impulses . . . .”).
61. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 239 (1930) (“[L]aw is uncertain
and must be uncertain.”); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 71 (Oxford Univ. Press
11th prtg.) (1930) (“People—and they are curiously many—who think that precedent
produces or ever did produce a certainty that did not involve matters of judgment and of
persuasion, or who think that what I have described involves improper equivocation by the
courts of departure from the court-ways of some golden age—such people simply do not
know our system of precedent in which they live.”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of
the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465–66 (1897) (“Behind the logical form [of a Judge’s
decision] lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative
grounds . . . . You can give any conclusion a logical form.”); Gary Minda, The
Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 633–34 (1989) (“As
members of an oppositional movement, legal realists revolted against forms of so-called
‘mechanical jurisprudence,’ namely formalism and conceptualism, which prevailed and
dominated the judicial imagination during the so-called formalist era of American legal
thought.” (emphasis in original)).
62. See, e.g., WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 1202, at 88–89 (explaining that the
factual specificity requirements of Code pleading were motivated by multiple policy
objectives, including the “speedy disposition of sham claims”).
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generally viewed cases as turning on fine factual distinctions that might be
impossible to comprehend solely from an initial complaint and before the exchange
of information allowed for under modern discovery.63
B. Conley v. Gibson’s Interpretation of Rule 8
The Supreme Court’s first, and most important, interpretation of what was
required under Rule 8 by a plaintiff in her initial complaint comes from Conley v.
Gibson.64 The Conley case is a staple of modern pleading jurisprudence.
Unfortunately, both courts and scholars have misinterpreted the case for decades.65
Because of this misinterpretation, commentators and courts have sometimes
presumed that the Federal Rules completely abolished the requirement that a
plaintiff’s complaint provide some factual specificity regarding the events on which
the defendant’s liability is premised.66 In reality, however, the analytical structure
of Conley—properly understood—is based on the premise that the Federal Rules
maintained some standard for factual specificity in a plaintiff’s complaint, albeit
much less than what had frequently been required under code pleading.
In Conley, black railroad employees sued their union in federal court under the
Railway Labor Act after they were fired from employment with the railroad and
white workers were hired to fill their positions.67 The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant union had discriminatorily failed to protect the fired workers in the same
way that it had protected white union members.68 The union filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint under, inter alia, Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim
under Rule 8;69 the motion was granted by the district court.70
At the Supreme Court level, the union argued that the motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under Rule 8 was justified by two arguments.71 The first was
that the plaintiffs had not pled their factual story with sufficient specificity.72 The
Court rejected the union’s argument, explaining that:

63. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 768 (2d Cir. 1946)
(Frank, J., concurring) (“I believe that the courts should now say forthrightly that the
judiciary regards the ordinary employee as one who needs and will receive the special
protection of the courts when, for a small consideration, he has given a release after an
injury. As Mr. Justice Holmes often urged, when an important issue of social policy arises, it
should be candidly, not evasively, articulated. In other contexts, the courts have openly
acknowledged that the economic inequality between the ordinary employer and the ordinary
individual employee usually means the absence of ‘free bargaining.’ I think the courts should
do so in these employee release cases.”).
64. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
65. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
66. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 41–42.
67. Id. at 41, 43.
68. Id. at 43.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 46–47.
72. Id. at 47.
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[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set
out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary,
all the Rules require is a ‘short and plain statement of the claim’ that
will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and
the grounds on which it rests.73
The union’s second argument was that the plaintiffs had failed to state a legal
claim for relief because the union’s duty not to racially discriminate amongst its
members under the Railway Labor Act ended “with the making of an agreement
between union and employer.”74 Because the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged
discrimination only after the formation of a bargaining agreement between the
union and the employer, the union argued that dismissal of the complaint was
proper.75 The Court also rejected this argument, explaining that the prohibition
against racial discrimination under the Railway Labor Act extended to “protection
of employee rights already secured by contract.”76 In discussing the union’s
argument regarding whether the statutory prohibition on discrimination extended
beyond the time at which an agreement had been reached by the union and
employer, the Court issued the infamous “no set of facts” language: “[W]e follow,
of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”77
There are several important conclusions that can be drawn from the manner in
which the Court disposed of the arguments in Conley. The first, and somewhat
obvious, is that the two arguments asserted by the railroad were legitimate grounds
on which to attack the validity of a complaint under Rule 8. The Court did not
reject the two grounds put forward by the railroad because they were nonsensical or
legally baseless; the Court rejected the railroad’s two separate grounds because
they were not warranted in this litigation context.78
Before exploring this point further, it is probably helpful to briefly address
terminology. Under modern parlance, the union’s argument regarding the factual
specificity contained in the Conley complaint was a “factual sufficiency” challenge
to the complaint79 while the argument regarding the applicability of the Railway

73. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
74. Id. at 46.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 45–46 (citing Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944); Continental
Collieries v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1942); Leimer v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co.,
108 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1940)).
78. See id. at 45–48 (rejecting the railroad’s arguments because they were not warranted
under the facts of the case but not suggesting that the arguments were baseless under the
law).
79. See, e.g., Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 3, at 830 (“Second, as to factual
sufficiency, the plaintiff practically must plead facts and even some evidence.”). This
concept is also sometimes expressed by the term “formal sufficiency.” See, e.g., THOMAS D.
ROWE, JR., SUZANNA SHERRY & JAY TIDMARSH, CIVIL PROCEDURE 60 (2004) (using and
explaining the term); SHERRY & TIDMARSH, supra note 20, at 111 (same); A. BENJAMIN
SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 434 (2007) (same).
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Labor Act was a “legal sufficiency” challenge.80 I believe this modern language is
somewhat confusing. Both of the union’s arguments in Conley were about the legal
sufficiency of the complaint under Rule 8. In this sense, then, distinguishing
between “factual” and “legal” sufficiency is potentially problematic because it
suggests that one inquiry involves a question of law while the other is a question of
fact. To avoid the potential confusion created by the legal sufficiency and factual
sufficiency terms, I propose two new terms for the two different types of challenges
that were made in Conley. First, a challenge to the specificity of the story contained
in the pleading will be termed a “factual specificity challenge.” Second, a challenge
to the legal theory relied on by the plaintiff will be termed a “legal theory
challenge.” Clearly distinguishing and understanding these two different types of
challenges is of critical importance to the topics developed in this Article.
The Supreme Court in Conley implicitly acknowledged the validity of both the
factual specificity and legal theory challenges made by the union when it addressed
both arguments rather than dismissing them out of hand. Of course, the notion that
a complaint can be dismissed when it fails to allege facts that, if proven, would
justify recovery—a legal theory challenge—is not controversial or noteworthy.
Under each pleading era, courts have dismissed complaints when the factual story
described in the complaint was either inconsistent with a viable legal theory of
recovery or not compatible with a logical extension of existing law.81
The Conley Court’s disposition of the factual specificity challenge by the
railroad, however, is important. Recall that the Federal Rules were a reaction to the
practice of some courts under code pleading to require the plaintiff to draft the
complaint with detailed factual specificity.82 In Conley, the railroad was asserting
the exact type of challenge that had so often proven successful under code pleading,
but which the rules had been drafted to address. Was such a challenge still fertile
ground for testing the validity of a complaint under Rule 8?
The Court answered this issue by opining that the “decisive” response to the
union’s factual specificity challenge was that the rules “do not require a claimant to
set out in detail”83 the factual allegations which form the basis of the dispute.
According to the Court, the factual specificity issue would be analyzed by whether
the plaintiff’s complaint had provided the “defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”84
Let us ignore, for the moment, the question of how much factual specificity is
required to comply with the “fair notice” standard described in Conley. A more
fundamental conclusion is possible from the Court’s “notice” standard for factual

80. See, e.g., Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 3, at 830 (“First, as to legal sufficiency,
the judge decides any pure issues of law in the traditional way for a Rule 12(b) (6) motion.”).
This concept is also sometimes expressed by the term “substantive sufficiency.” See, e.g.,
ROWE, JR., supra note 79, at 60 (using and explaining the term); SPENCER, supra note 79, at
434 (same).
81. See supra note 41 (discussing availability of demurrer under common law pleading);
see generally supra text accompanying notes 40–45 (discussing dismissal of complaint
under code pleading).
82. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
83. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
84. Id.
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specificity: there is some standard for factual specificity which must be met in order
to comply with the requirements of Rule 8. The Conley Court did not say that
factual specificity was no longer required under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Court acknowledged that the intent of the rules was to require less
factual specificity, but it nevertheless articulated a standard for measuring factual
specificity and concluded that the standard had been met in the case before the
Court.85
Unfortunately, this very basic proposition—that there is some standard for
factual specificity required under Rule 8, albeit a more lenient standard than what
had existed under code pleading—has sometimes been obscured by a
misinterpretation of the Conley opinion. This misinterpretation arises from the
Conley Court’s disposition of the union’s legal theory challenge. Before analyzing
the underlying substantive law of the Railway Labor Act, the Court uttered the
famous phrase: “[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”86
The location of this phrase within the Conley opinion, in the portion discussing
the union’s legal argument regarding the proper interpretation of the Railway Labor
Act, makes it abundantly clear that this phrase was intended to guide a court in
considering a legal theory challenge. A few other scholars have very recently come
to the same realization;87 probably, like me, they were forced to reexamine Conley
in their efforts to make sense of the Court’s retirement of this language in Twombly.
Previously, however, commentators had often mistakenly assumed that the “no set
of facts” language governed the factual specificity analysis.88 Having thus erred,

85. Other commentators have interpreted Conley in a similar manner. See WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 30, § 1202, at 94 (“Thus, the Court [in Conley] recognized . . . that [Rule
8] does contemplate the statement of circumstances, occurrences, and events in support of
the claim presented.”).
86. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46.
87. See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7–9 (2009) (statement of Stephen B. Burbank,
David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law
School) (concluding that Conley’s “no set of facts language” related to “legal sufficiency”);
Emily M. Sherwin, The Story of Conley: Precedent by Accident, in CIVIL PROCEDURE
STORIES 281, 301 (Kevin Clermont ed., 2004) (same); Wendy Gerwick Couture, Conley v.
Gibson’s “No Set of Facts” Test: Neither Cancer Nor Cure, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. PENN
STATIM 19, 19 (2010) (same); Bradley Scott Shannon, I Have Federal Pleading All Figured
Out, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 453, 455–56 (2010) (same).
88. See, e.g., Charles B. Campbell, A “Plausible” Showing After Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 9 NEV. L.J. 1, 21 (2008) (discussing Conley’s “no set of facts” language as going
towards the factual specificity requirements of Rule 8); Yoichiro Hamabe, Functions of Rule
12(b)(6) in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A Categorization Approach, 15 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 119, 164 (1993) (explaining the view that Conley’s “no set of facts” language can be
interpreted such that “Rule 12(b)(6) can perform virtually no factual interception function”).
Other commentators have made a similar error in interpreting Conley’s “no set of facts”
language by failing to distinguish between the factual specificity and legal theory inquiry.
See Couture, supra note 87, at 28 n.62 (“Subsequent courts and commentators have
contributed to the confusion between the ‘no set of facts’ legal sufficiency test and the ‘fair
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scholars presumed that the Conley “no set of facts” language eviscerated any
factual specificity analysis of a plaintiff’s complaint. For example, numerous
scholars have uttered phrases similar to the following: “Literal compliance with
Conley v. Gibson could consist simply of giving the names of the plaintiff and the
defendant, and asking for judgment.”89 This conclusion is wrong because it ignores
the factual specificity requirements of Rule 8. The “notice pleading” test for factual
specificity established under Conley was obviously intended to be a more lenient
approach to factual specificity than what had existed under code pleading, but, as
discussed above, it is clear that a plaintiff’s complaint must tell a story with at least
some factual “meat” or detail.
To be fair to those who have had misinterpreted Conley’s “no set of facts”
language as going towards factual specificity, some of the blame for this confusion
should be attributed to the Conley opinion, which was not a model of clarity. First,
the Conley opinion was not as clear as it could have been in separating out the
different types of challenges that were being made to the complaint. Although the
Court responded to both the factual specificity and legal theory challenges made by
the union, it lumped them together in the Conley opinion as “respondents’ final
ground.”90 The union had asserted two other arguments in support of the district
court’s dismissal of the complaint—one based on subject matter jurisdiction and
one based on the failure to join an indispensable party. Thus, the Court was
technically correct to group the union’s factual specificity and legal theory
challenges together, because both challenges attacked the legal sufficiency of the
pleading under Rule 8. The Court could have been more blatant, however, in
distinguishing between the two different methods for demonstrating that a
complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 8.
Second, in articulating the “no set of facts” standard, the Court again failed to
carefully identify the standard as going to the legal theory challenge only. The
Court stated that a “complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts.”91 To
clarify that the standard being described went to a legal theory challenge, the Court
should have stated that “a complaint should not be dismissed [because the
plaintiff’s legal theory is without merit] unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts.” As written, the Court’s phrasing gives the
appearance that the “no set of facts” language is an all-encompassing standard for
determining a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge to a complaint. Finally, the Conley “no set of
facts” language further obfuscates the issue by asking what the plaintiff “can
prove.”92 This tends to suggest that an examination of the likely truth of the facts
that have been pled by the plaintiff is appropriate at the pleadings stage. Of course,
notice’ factual sufficiency test by conflating the two standards and treating them as
synonymous.”).
89. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665,
1685 (1998); see also FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.6, at 190 (5th ed. 2001) (concluding the same regarding Conley’s “no
set of facts” language); Miller, supra note 5, at 99 (reasoning that “literal application” of
Conley’s “no set of facts” language “seems unworkable”).
90. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46.
91. Id. at 45.
92. Id.
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this is flatly wrong. The critical question at the pleadings stage is not what will
ultimately be proven but instead what has been alleged by the plaintiff.93
As mentioned above, a few other scholars have recently recognized that the “no
set of facts” language in Conley was used in discussing the legal theory rather than
factual specificity challenge in that case.94 The full import of this realization,
however, has not yet been fully explored. Recognizing that the “no set of facts”
language was intended to apply to a legal theory challenge analysis allows certain
insights to be reached about the nature of both a legal theory challenge and a
factual specificity challenge under Rule 8.
The first insight relates to the analysis required for a legal theory challenge. In
analyzing whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff in the complaint are actionable
under legal doctrine, the “no set of facts” language from Conley instructs district
courts on how to proceed when necessary facts are either missing from the
complaint or are ambiguously described. District courts are to “fill in the gaps”
such that the facts necessary for asserting a viable legal claim are assumed in favor
of the plaintiff as long as those assumed facts are not inconsistent with what has
been actually pled by the plaintiff. Thus, if the cause of action in consideration
requires A, B, C, and D, but plaintiff has pled only A, C, and D, Conley’s “no set of
facts” test requires that B be assumed so long as B is not inconsistent with the
factual story told in the plaintiff’s complaint. Thus, only in scenarios in which the
plaintiff has pled A, C, D, and not B could the district court dismiss based on a
substantive legal validity challenge. Stated differently, the “no set of facts”
language instructs courts not to dismiss a complaint pursuant to a legal theory
challenge unless it is clear on the face of the complaint that recovery is prohibited.
The second insight involves the “notice” standard for factual specificity adopted
in Conley. By instructing district courts to fill gaps in a plaintiff’s factual story
when necessary for adjudging the substantive legal merit of the plaintiff’s claim,
considerable light is shed on the standard under Rule 8 for the factual specificity
that is necessary to state a claim. The Conley “no set of facts” language
contemplates scenarios in which a complaint can survive a factual specificity
challenge even though the facts necessary to state a viable legal claim are omitted
or ambiguous. There is no reason for a district court, in considering the viability of
the plaintiff’s legal theory, to assume facts in order to perform this analysis if the
complaint is nevertheless deficient because it has not stated the facts with sufficient
specificity. To draw on the analogy in the above paragraph, if a plaintiff’s
complaint alleging only A, C, and D fails to state a claim because of a lack of
factual specificity, there is no reason to proceed to the question of how to judge the
validity of the plaintiff’s legal theory in light of the missing B allegation. The
district court could dismiss the complaint, or give the plaintiff an opportunity to
amend, but “filling in the gap” in favor of the plaintiff would be unnecessary.
This understanding of Conley, in which a plaintiff is not always required to
plead all of the facts that will ultimately need to be proven in order to recover from
the defendant, is confirmed by the Court’s citation to a trio of appellate court

93. See, e.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (“For the purposes of a
motion to dismiss, the material allegations of the complaint are taken as admitted.”).
94. See supra note 80.
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decisions, including the celebrated case of Dioguardi v. Durning.95 The Dioguardi
case was written by Judge Charles Clark,96 who was the principal architect of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.97 The Dioguardi case involved a “home drawn”
complaint that told a somewhat ambiguous story about bottles of tonics which had
been sold at a public auction.98 For instance, the complaint “does not make wholly
clear”99 how the tonics had come into the defendant’s possession. The district court
had granted the defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Rule 8.100 In reversing the dismissal, Judge Clark admonished the
district court for “judicial haste which in the long run makes waste.”101 Although
Judge Clark’s opinion acknowledged the ambiguities in the plaintiff’s factual
story,102 he emphasized that factual specificity under the rules did not require the
plaintiff to plead every fact which would ultimately be necessary under existing
legal doctrine for recovery: “Under the new rules of civil procedure, there is no
pleading requirement of stating ‘facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action,’ . . . .”103
Moreover, in some of his nonjudicial opinions, Clark again expressed the view
that a plaintiff’s complaint need not allege all of the facts that will ultimately need
to be proven for the plaintiff to recover. Writing in 1948 about the “notice
pleading” standard that would eventually be associated with the newly drafted
Federal Rules, Clark stated: “The prevailing idea at the present time seems to be
that notice should be given of all the operative facts going to make up the plaintiff’s
cause of action, except, of course, those which are presumed or may properly come
from the other side.”104 Later in the same book, Clark similarly opined: “[C]ertain
matters of the kind which the law will conclude from the other facts pleaded, or of
which the court has judicial knowledge, or which lie in the knowledge more of the
defendant than the plaintiff, need not be set forth even though they are material
operative facts.”105

95. 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
96. See generally id.
97. See generally Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J.
177 (1958).
98. See Dioguardi, 139 F.2d at 774.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 774–75.
102. See id. at 775 (describing the complaint as “inartistically” drafted).
103. Id.; see also id. at 774. (“We think that, however inartistically they may be stated,
the plaintiff has disclosed his claims that the collector has converted or otherwise done away
with two of his cases of medicinal tonics and has sold the rest in a manner incompatible with
the public auction he had announced . . . .”). Judge Clark’s opinion in Dioguardi v. Durning
was partly the impetus for a resolution which was adopted at the Ninth Circuit Judicial
Conference in 1952 that proposed amending Rule 8(a)(2) to read as follows: “[A] short and
plain statement of the claim, showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, which statement
shall contain the facts constituting a cause of action.” See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30,
§ 1216, at 239. This proposal was referred to the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules,
where it was rejected. See id.
104. Clark, supra note 41, at 271.
105. Id. at 275.
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The Conley Court’s citation to Clark’s Dioguardi opinion is telling not only
because of the ideas expressed by Clark in that opinion but also because of the
views that Clark had expressed in other contexts about the rules which he
fathered.106 Moreover, Clark was not alone in his view; other commentators
expressed the same view during this time.107
Conley, properly understood, stands for the proposition that a plaintiff can meet
the notice test for factual specificity even though factual allegations that are
necessary to support a legal right to recovery are missing.108 Factual specificity is
governed by the notice standard, and although increased specificity will usually
assist a judge in determining the relevant law governing the case, this is not a
purpose attributed to the factual specificity analysis. All of the factual allegations
necessary to state a cause of action need not be pled.
Why does this interpretation of Conley matter in trying to understand Twombly
and Iqbal? After all, the Court retired the misunderstood “no set of facts” language
in Twombly.109 Moreover, leading commentators have identified confusion in the
courts as to whether all the facts necessary to state a claim for relief must be alleged
in a complaint.110 Thus, it seems not all lower federal courts have interpreted
Conley in the manner suggested herein.
A proper understanding of Conley is important because it demonstrates the
dramatic drift in pleading jurisprudence from Conley to Iqbal and undermines the
legitimacy of the decision reached by the Court in Iqbal. Later in this Article, after
discussing the Iqbal case, I will argue that the allegation of discriminatory intent in
Iqbal was the exact type of factual allegation that the Conley Court (and
commentators such as Clark) believed need not be included in a complaint. Thus,
according to the Conley Court, the plaintiff would not have needed to even include

106. Judge Clark was also generally supportive of the decision reached by the Court in
Conley, although he expressed some reservations about the term “notice pleading.” See
Clark, supra note 97, at 181 (speaking in a supportive manner of the Conley decision but
describing some of the disadvantages of the term “notice pleading”).
107. See, e.g., MILLAR, supra note 24, at 190–94 (considering the issue and concluding
that all of the factual elements of a cause of action need not be alleged in order to give notice
to the defendant); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 1216, at 214–20 (“A reading
of Garcia, Conley, Swierkiewicz, and a host of other cases . . . suggests that the
complaint . . . need not state with precision all of the elements that are necessary to give rise
to a legal basis for recovery as long as fair notice of the action is provided to the opposing
party.”).
108. But see WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 1216, at 212 (“Neither is the Supreme
Court’s oft-quoted decision in Conley v. Gibson clear on whether all the elements of a prima
facie case or cause of action must be stated [in a complaint].”).
109. See Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007).
110. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 1216, at 211 (“The confusion that existed
in the years following the adoption of the federal rules as to whether a claim for relief must
state a ‘cause of action’ is typified by Garcia v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc. . . . .”); see
also 2 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 8.04[1a][a] (3d ed. 2011)
(“[S]ome courts attempted to frame a pleading standard based on the elements of a claim
rather than on the fair notice standard. These courts stated that a complaint had to contain
either direct or inferential allegations with respect to all material elements necessary to
sustain recovery under some viable cause of action.”).
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an allegation of the defendants’ discriminatory intent, yet the Iqbal Court dismissed
the plaintiff’s complaint because it did not find this allegation to be plausible.111
For a rule that has not been changed in the period between Conley and Iqbal, the
shift from “you don’t need to allege it” to “you do need to allege it and you need to
show that it is plausible” is quite dramatic.112
II. RECOGNIZING TWOMBLY AS A FACTUAL SPECIFICITY CASE
If the history of pleading and the Conley opinion recognize two different
manners of challenging the sufficiency of a complaint113—factual specificity and
legal theory—the next step in understanding the Twombly and Iqbal cases is to
recognize that Twombly was a case about the factual specificity of the plaintiffs’
complaint. Upon reflection, this conclusion is somewhat obvious. Nevertheless, in
the confusion created by the introduction of the plausibility analysis, this somewhat
simple proposition has sometimes been lost in the shuffle.114 For instance, even
Professor Adam Steinman’s brilliant article, The Pleading Problem, which I
consider to be the most insightful article to date on Twombly and Iqbal and which
will be discussed favorably below, does not pinpoint factual specificity (or the lack
thereof) as the underlying problem in Twombly.115 Recognizing Twombly as a case
about the factual specificity of the complaint, however, is necessary to a proper
understanding of both Twombly and Iqbal.
The Twombly litigation was instigated against major telecommunications
providers as a class action on behalf of all “subscribers of local telephone and/or
high speed internet services . . . from February 8, 1996 to present.”116 The class
asserted causes of action under section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits
“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in

111. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009).
112. See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 557 (2010) (noting that Rule 8(a)(2) has been
unchanged since the rules were adopted in 1938).
113. See Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become
(Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 61 (2007) (“The present
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a plaintiff’s case to be attacked either for its legal or
factual insufficiency.”).
114. Some commentators who have focused on this question have mistakenly identified
Twombly as a case involving a legal theory challenge rather than a factual specificity
challenge. See Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the Probable: Defining
the Plausibility Standard After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94
MINN. L. REV. 505, 530–31 (2009) (concluding that Twombly did not involve the “amount of
detail required by Rule 8(a)(2)” but rather the “legal merit” of the complaint). But see
Schwartz & Appel, supra note 19, at 1127 (“The determination of plausibility, of course,
depends on the factual specificity of a complaint.”).
115. See generally Steinman, supra note 5.
116. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550 (quoting Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint
at ¶ 53, Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02 CIV.
10220)).
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restraint of trade or commerce”117 The complaint alleged that the defendants had
entered into an illegal conspiracy:
Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that [the defendants] have
entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent
competitive entry in their respective local telephone and/or high speed
internet services markets and have agreed not to compete with one
another and otherwise allocated customers and markets to one
another.118
In addition to this generic allegation of a conspiracy, however, the complaint
recounted in great detail the parallel business conduct of the defendants.119
Although independent parallel conduct is not itself illegal, previous cases had
established that the existence of parallel conduct was probative as to whether an
illegal conspiracy or agreement had actually taken place.120
At the trial court level, the defendants brought a motion to dismiss the complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules on the theory that the plaintiffs had failed
to state a claim as required under Rule 8.121 The district court granted the motion to
dismiss;122 and the Supreme Court eventually upheld the decision of the district
court.123
The best way to demonstrate that Twombly is, at heart, a case about factual
specificity is to imagine how the Twombly litigation would have unfolded had the
plaintiffs’ complaint included the following allegations:
1.
2.
3.

On February 6, 1996, all of the defendants named in this
lawsuit met at the Marriot Hotel in Waco, Texas.
During this meeting, defendants entered into an agreement to
engage in parallel business behavior.
The agreement was memorialized in a document that was
drafted on the evening of February 16, although no formal
contract was ever drafted.

Assuming that this factually specific hypothetical complaint would have survived
past the Twombly defendants’ motion to dismiss (and I believe this assumption is
beyond assailment),124 the precise issue raised by the Twombly litigation can be

117. Id. (quoting Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006)).
118. Id. at 551 (quoting ¶ 51 of the plaintiffs’ complaint).
119. See id. at 550–51.
120. See id. at 556.
121. See Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
122. See id.
123. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
124. See, e.g., Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S.
600, 611–12 (1914) (explaining that direct evidence is usually unavailable in a conspiracy
case but also clearly implying that direct evidence is sufficient to establish a conspiracy);
Skye M. McQueen, The Summary Judgment Standard in Antitrust Conspiracy Cases and In
re Travel Agency Commission Antitrust Litigation, 62 J. AIR L. & COM. 1155, 1192 (1997)
(concluding that direct evidence will usually be sufficient to create a reasonable inference of
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pinpointed. The difference between this hypothetical complaint and the “bare
assertion of conspiracy” in the actual Twombly complaint is, of course, the level of
factual specificity with which the allegation of conspiracy or agreement is made.
As the Court explained in the Twombly opinion, the “bare assertion of
conspiracy”125 in the actual Twombly complaint was bereft of any mention of the
“specific time, place, or person involved in the alleged conspiracies.”126 The
hypothetical complaint fills this void by providing factual specificity as to when,
where, how, and by whom the agreement was perfected.
The problem with the Twombly opinion is that it is not as explicit as it could
have been in recognizing factual specificity as the underlying problem with the
plaintiffs’ complaint. The opinion discusses factual specificity at various places in
the opinion. The opinion cites the Conley notice test127 for factual specificity and
affirms that a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations.”128 The
majority admonishes the dissent for “suggesting that the Federal Rules somehow
dispensed with the pleading of facts altogether.”129 And the dissenting opinion by
Justice Stevens notes that “this is a case in which there is no dispute about the
substantive law.”130
At no point in Twombly, however, does the Court clearly pronounce that it is
revisiting the ancient question of the factual specificity necessary for a plaintiff’s
complaint. The closest the opinion comes in this regard is the following: “This case
presents the antecedent question of what a plaintiff must plead in order to state a
claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act.”131 Even here, though, the Court fails to
precisely identify that the “antecedent question”132 regarding the plaintiff’s
complaint was the lack of factual specificity with which the alleged conspiracy or
agreement was described. The opinions by both the district court and the Second
Circuit in the Twombly litigation fall into this same pattern: both courts mention
factual specificity and the standards for measuring factual specificity, but neither
directly pinpoints factual specificity as the underlying problem with the plaintiffs’
complaint.133
The Court’s failure to clearly identify the factual specificity issue in Twombly is
itself problematic, but this problem is made worse by the fact that the Court’s
analysis of the factual specificity of the Twombly complaint is hidden in the
opinion. The Court’s observation that the Twombly complaint “mentioned no
specific time, place, or person involved in the alleged conspiracies” is buried in
footnote ten of the opinion.134 And, even here, the Court’s discussion is somewhat
muddled. The Court contrasts the “lack of notice” provided by the “bare
a conspiracy).
125. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
126. Id. at 565 n.10.
127. See id. at 561.
128. Id. at 555.
129. Id. at 555 n.3 (citing Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 571 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 554–55.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 544; see generally Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir.
2005); Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
134. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10.
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allegations” in the Twombly complaint with that provided by Form 9 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the model form for pleading negligence.135 But in the
same footnote, the Court suggests that the Twombly complaint has met the notice
standard required by Rule 8 by comparing the actual Twombly complaint to one
which “had not explained that the claim of agreement rested on the parallel conduct
described.”136
Adding to the ambiguity in the Twombly opinion is the Court’s extensive
discussion, and ultimate retirement, of Conley’s “no set of facts” language.137 As
recounted above, this language was originally intended to guide a court in
considering a legal theory challenge to a complaint.138 Because the critical question
in Twombly was the factual specificity with which the complaint had been drafted,
Conley’s “no set of facts” language was not relevant to the analysis. Nevertheless,
the Court devoted a considerable portion of the Twombly opinion to Conley’s “no
set of facts” language, ultimately concluding that the language should be retired.
Because this language had often been misinterpreted as going towards the factual
specificity question, and because commentators who made this mistake then
presumed that there was no standard for factual specificity under the rules, there
was a valid reason for the Court to retire the “no set of facts” language in Twombly.
The Twombly opinion, however, is ambiguous as to whether it is retiring Conley’s
“no set of facts” language because the language has been misinterpreted (by
mistakenly addressing factual specificity) or because the language has been
interpreted correctly (as actually going towards factual specificity) but that the
conclusion that follows from this interpretation is not sound.139 In other words, it is
not clear whether the Court retired Conley’s “no set of facts” language because it
had been misunderstood by other courts and commentators or because the Court
itself shared in this misunderstanding. At certain points in the opinion, the Court
writes as if it is retiring the language because everybody else has misunderstood the
language.140 At other points in the opinion, however, the Court seems to share in
the erroneous conclusion that the “no set of facts” language was intended to govern
the question of factual specificity.141 Regardless of the reason why Conley’s “no set

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See id.
Id.
See id. at 561–63.
See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text.
Compare CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, 20 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: FEDERAL PRACTICE DESKBOOK § 72 (2002) (“Justice Souter carefully noted that
Conley itself was not being overturned; it was the lower courts that had taken the ‘no set of
facts’ language out of context.”), with A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C.
L. REV. 431, 445–46 (2008) (“The problem with [Twombly] . . . is that it significantly raises
the pleading bar beyond where Conley had placed it long ago.”), and Robert E. Shapiro,
Requiescat in Pace, 34 LITIGATION, 67, 68 (2007) (arguing that Twombly “did not just
overrule Conley, it seems to overrule notice pleading itself”).
140. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562 (“[T]here is no need to pile up further citations to
show that Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language has been questioned, criticized, and explained
away long enough.”).
141. For instance, the Court states that under “a focused and literal reading of Conley’s
‘no set of facts’ [language], a wholly conclusory statement of claim would survive a motion
to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff might later
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of facts” test was retired, the manner in which the Twombly Court discussed the
issue further obscured the basic point that the underlying problem with the
Twombly complaint was the lack of factual specificity in describing the alleged
agreement amongst the defendants.
Considering all of the static in the Twombly opinion, it is not surprising that it
has largely gone unnoticed that Twombly was primarily a case about the factual
specificity in the complaint. This conclusion is clear, however, assuming that the
hypothetical complaint discussed above (in which an agreement is described as
having taken place in Waco, Texas on February 16, 1996, at the Marriot Hotel)
would not have been dismissed in Twombly. This Article will proceed upon that
assumption.
The most common alternative to the view that Twombly was, at heart, about
factual specificity is that the Court’s plausibility analysis is a completely new
metric by which to judge the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 8 and that this
analysis is completely independent from the traditional inquiries of factual
specificity and legal theory.142 I find this alternative too bizarre to be plausible. The
notion that the Supreme Court would introduce a completely new requirement—
plausibility—decades after the promulgation of Rule 8 contradicts the tone of the
Twombly opinion itself. Granted, Twombly does retire the misunderstood language
from Conley, and in certain portions of the Twombly opinion, the Court writes
about the plausibility analysis as if it is a completely new requirement under
Rule 8.143 Nevertheless, broadly speaking, the Twombly opinion is not written as a
revolt against established precedent and pleading principles. Instead, the Court’s
existing case law on pleading is regularly cited in the opinion, as if everything the
Court is saying in Twombly is consistent with what it has said before.144 The tone of
the opinion is reverent, not revolutionary.
The better explanation, recounted above, is that Twombly was, at heart, about
factual specificity. Nevertheless, the plausibility analysis used by the Court in
Twombly cannot be ignored. If Twombly was ultimately about the factual

establish some ‘set of [undisclosed] facts’ to support recovery.” Id. at 561. This is similar to
the claims made by some academics that “[l]iteral compliance with Conley v. Gibson could
consist simply of giving the names of the plaintiff and the defendant, and asking for
judgment.” Hazard, supra note 89, at 1685. In fact, the Court even cites to some of the
academics who have asserted this conclusion based on the mistaken assumption that
Conley’s “no set of facts” language governs the factual specificity question. See Twombly,
550 U.S. at 562 (citing, among others, Professor Hazard).
142. See, e.g., Shannon, supra note 87, at 475 & n.91 (noting that “[t]he final way [in
addition to factual specificity and legal theory] in which an action may be dismissed for
failure to state a claim is insufficiency of proof,” but later qualifying this statement by
acknowledging that insufficiency of proof is not “actually . . . per se” a separate grounds for
dismissal (emphasis in original)).
143. See, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (“The need at the pleading stage for allegations
plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold
requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to ‘show that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Rule 8)).
144. See id. at 555 (citing Conley, 355 U.S. 41, 47); id. at 555–56 (citing Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002), and Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327
(1989)); id. at 557 (citing Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005)).
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specificity with which the plaintiff’s complaint had been drafted, it is necessary to
establish a link between factual specificity and plausibility.
III. LINKING FACTUAL SPECIFICITY TO THE PLAUSIBILITY ANALYSIS: WHEN IS THE
PLAUSIBILITY ANALYSIS REQUIRED UNDER TWOMBLY?
If factual specificity was the core of the problem with the complaint in
Twombly, it is then necessary to determine how the issue of factual specificity
relates to the infamous plausibility analysis that was introduced and employed by
the Court in Twombly. In short, what does plausibility have to do with factual
specificity? The answer to this question is of utmost importance. Once the
relationship between factual specificity and plausibility is understood, it is possible
to determine whether the plausibility analysis is required in all civil cases or
whether it is required less frequently. Knowing when to apply the plausibility
analysis is impossible unless the relationship between plausibility and factual
specificity is understood.
There are two possible ways to think about the relationship between factual
specificity and plausibility. The first is that the plausibility analysis serves as a
proxy for answering the question of factual specificity.145 Under this theory, the
question of whether a complaint has been drafted with the requisite factual
specificity is answered by considering whether enough factual detail has been
provided such that the plaintiff’s story is plausible. Thus, the plausibility analysis is
a tool by which the factual specificity of a complaint is measured.
The second way in which the relationship between factual specificity and
plausibility can be explained is dramatically different. Pursuant to this
understanding, the plausibility analysis is only triggered when the complaint has
failed the test for factual specificity.146 The plausibility analysis is not a measure for
whether the complaint has been drafted with sufficient factual specificity; it is
instead an analysis that is performed only after the separate specificity analysis has
been conducted. Plausibility is a by-product of the factual specificity question, but
it does not answer the factual specificity question.
The two different theories as to the relationship between factual specificity and
plausibility each require a different conclusion as to when the plausibility analysis
is necessary. Under the first theory, in which plausibility is a measure of the
complaint’s factual specificity, the plausibility test is required for every civil
complaint filed in federal court.147 Most commentators have adopted this
understanding as to when plausibility is required. Under the second theory,
however, the plausibility analysis is much less prevalent: because the plausibility
analysis is triggered only by an independent defect in the complaint, in many
(indeed, probably most) cases the plausibility analysis will be unnecessary. This
perspective has gained traction recently, spurred by Professor Steinman’s recent
article in the Stanford Law Review.

145. See infra Part III.A.
146. See infra Part III.B.
147. See, e.g., Anderson & Huffman, supra note 3, at 4 (“Because the plausibility
standard controls access to litigation in every civil action in federal court, piercing the murk
of the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard is crucial.”).
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Unfortunately, similar to the failure of the Twombly opinion to identify factual
specificity as the underlying problem in the complaint, the Twombly opinion is
somewhat ambiguous as to the relationship between plausibility and factual
specificity. The Twombly opinion never specifically addresses how the newly
introduced plausibility analysis relates to the question of factual specificity.
Nevertheless, upon close inspection, it becomes clear that the Twombly Court
viewed plausibility as something triggered by a lack of factual specificity in the
complaint. This section will explain how this conclusion is possible from a close
reading of the Twombly opinion.
A. Plausibility as a Measure for Factual Specificity
The first theory as to the relationship between factual specificity and plausibility
is that plausibility serves as a measure for whether the complaint has been drafted
with sufficient specificity. That is, a complaint contains sufficient factual
specificity when it is plausible; a pleading must be factually specific enough that it
strikes the district court judge as a plausible story. Pursuant to this understanding,
plausibility is a way to measure whether a complaint is sufficiently factually
specific. Stated slightly differently, plausibility is a function or goal to be achieved
by the requirement of factual specificity, and therefore, must be considered in
answering the question whether the complaint has been drafted with sufficient
factual specificity.
This understanding of the relationship between factual specificity and
plausibility is somewhat intuitive. Consider the detective who is investigating a
murder and is interviewing a suspect as to his whereabouts on the date of the
murder. The detective is going to want the suspect to tell the story of his
whereabouts on the date of the murder with as much specificity as possible. We
have all likely witnessed this familiar scenario dozens of times on television or in
the movies:
Detective:
Suspect:
Detective:
Suspect:
Detective:

Where were you on the night of the murder?
At home watching television.
What were you watching?
Sports.
Who was playing? Who won? What was the score?

The detective pushes the suspect for factual specificity because of an intuition
that if the story is true, the suspect will be able to tell it with greater specificity. The
first theory as to how plausibility relates to specificity is based on a premise
somewhat similar to what is occurring in the detective hypothetical. A complaint
drafted with factual precision and detail tends to signal that the pleader is telling an
accurate story.148 In the detective example, if the suspect cannot describe with

148. Professor Hartnett has suggested that there is no necessary correlation between
specificity and plausibility. See Hartnett, supra note 4, at 496 (“It is not simply that specific
allegations can make an inference less plausible, but that specificity has no necessary
connection to plausibility of inference.”). To support his claim, Professor Hartnett discusses
a hypothetical in which the defendant’s “negligence” is being considered. Whether a
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factual particularity his actions on the night of the murder, it is presumably because
he is lying. In the context of complaints in federal court, a dearth of factual
precision in the complaint does not usually suggest untruthfulness by the drafter but
rather that the drafter is without firsthand knowledge of the events alleged. This
was the case in Twombly. If the plaintiffs had had firsthand knowledge of an
agreement amongst the defendants, they would have included that specific
information in the complaint. The lack of factual specificity did not suggest that the
plaintiffs were lying when they alleged that an agreement had been made but rather
that the plaintiffs were uncertain that this allegation was accurate. On a deeper
level, the detective example and the first theory of the relationship between factual
specificity and plausibility are the same in that there is a relationship between
factual specificity and truth. The more factual specificity, the more plausible is the
truth of what is stated.
This understanding of the plausibility analysis can be stated using algebraic
terms, which will be helpful later in the Article. A complaint describing an event
generically, rather than specifically, can be expressed by the term “X.” A complaint
in which an event is described with more factual specificity can be expressed as
“X1, X2, X3” with each of the separate units representing some specific description
or factual detail of the event “X.” Thus, X would represent the Twombly
complaint’s generic description of the alleged conspiracy between the defendants.
The hypothetical complaint discussed earlier in this Article, in which the same
alleged event is described in more detail (the meeting took place in Waco, Texas,
on February 16, 1996, at the Marriot Hotel) would be represented by X1, X2, X3.
Under the first theory of the relationship between factual specificity and
plausibility, the factual specificity of the complaint is measured by whether the
event X is described with sufficient particularity (“1, 2, 3”) such that it is plausible
that event X actually occurred. In other words: Does X1, X2, X3 imply the existence
of X? We can use an arrow to represent the inferential analysis, thus: X1, X2,
X3ÆX?
Under this interpretation of the relationship between factual specificity and
plausibility, the plausibility analysis is required for every complaint filed in federal
court. As detailed in Part I of this Article, a complaint which does not contain
sufficient factual specificity can be challenged as failing to “state a claim” under
Rule 8. All civil complaints in federal court must, therefore, meet the standard for
factual specificity. If factual specificity is measured under the plausibility analysis,
the plausibility analysis is required in every case. Rule 8 requires factual
specificity, factual specificity is measured by plausibility, and Rule 8 thus requires
a determination under the plausibility analysis for every case.
B. Plausibility Only When Factual Specificity Standards Are Not Met
The second theory as to the relationship between plausibility and factual
specificity is based on the assumption that plausibility is not related to the question
of whether the complaint has been drafted with sufficient factual specificity. Under

defendant was negligent, however, is a legal question, not a factual question. As will be
explained below, the plausibility analysis in Twombly and Iqbal was focused on the question
of whether certain facts were plausible.
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this theory, the complaint’s factual specificity is measured first, without regard to a
plausibility analysis. If the complaint is drafted with sufficient factual specificity,
the plausibility analysis is never reached. If, however, the complaint fails the test
for factual specificity, the plausibility analysis is triggered. Once triggered, the
plausibility analysis requires the court to consider whether other factual allegations
in the complaint permit the plaintiff to proceed even though the complaint contains
factual allegations that fail the test for factual specificity.
This view of the relationship between factual specificity and plausibility
anticipates a slightly different role for the plausibility analysis, once triggered.
Under both theories, the plausibility analysis requires an inferential inquiry. Under
the first theory, the inferences are drawn from the factual specificity (or lack
thereof) contained in the complaint. Under the second theory, however, the
inferential inquiry is not based on the specifics (or lack thereof) regarding the event
in question, but rather the other allegations in the complaint that are probative as to
whether the generically described event actually occurred.
Here, again, the use of algebraic terms is helpful. Under the second theory of the
relationship between factual specificity and plausibility, the starting point is the
failure of an allegation to comply with Rule 8’s standard for factual specificity.
Thus, we can assume a generic allegation X. The conclusion that the complaint is
not sufficiently factual specific is made without regard to a plausibility analysis.
The plausibility analysis then considers whether other allegations in the complaint,
which will be labeled Y and Z, permit the plaintiff to proceed despite the generic
allegation of event X. Thus: Y, ZÆ X?
Notice that under both theories of the relationship between plausibility and
factual specificity, the truthfulness or accuracy of the allegation of event X is at
issue. And, under both theories, the plausibility analysis seeks to gauge whether the
actual occurrence of event X can be inferred from certain information. The two
theories differ, however, on the source from which event X is to be inferred. Under
the first theory of the relationship between plausibility and factual specificity, the
question is whether event X has been described with sufficient specificity to permit
the inference that event X occurred. Under the second theory, however, the
question is whether event X can be inferred from other allegations in the complaint.
The most important aspect of the second theory of the relationship between
factual specificity and plausibility is that plausibility is not required for every
complaint filed in federal court. Indeed, in most cases, the plausibility analysis will
not need to be conducted. A complaint that meets the factual specificity standard—
and plausibility plays no part in this determination—will not be evaluated under a
plausibility analysis. The plausibility analysis is triggered only when the test for
factual specificity has failed.
The second theory as to the relationship between factual specificity and
plausibility has a similar analytical structure to the groundbreaking views expressed
by Professor Steinman in his article The Pleading Problem. As part of his call for a
plain pleading understanding of Rule 8, Professor Steinman advocates for an
understanding of the plausibility analysis in which “plausibility is a secondary
inquiry that need not be undertaken at all.”149 Ultimately, I believe that Professor

149. Steinman, supra note 5, at 1314.
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Steinman errs in conceptualizing plausibility as being triggered by “conclusory
allegations,”150 and I believe that this error can be traced to his failure to realize that
Twombly was, at heart, a case about factual specificity. This issue will be explored
at length in the next Part.151 Regardless, the importance of Professor Steinman’s
idea that plausibility might be triggered by other defects in a complaint cannot be
overstated. Before his work, the common presumption was that the plausibility
analysis was required for every civil complaint filed in federal court.152 His article
was the first to provide an account of the plausibility analysis in which plausibility
is triggered by other defects in a complaint and thus might often be unnecessary in
adjudging the legal sufficiency of a complaint.
C. Twombly and the Relationship Between Factual Specificity and Plausibility
It takes some effort to determine from Twombly which of the two theories as to
the relationship between factual specificity and plausibility is correct. The Twombly
opinion never specifically addresses the issue. This is not necessarily surprising, of
course, considering that the Twombly opinion never even directly pinpoints factual
specificity as the fundamental problem with the plaintiffs’ complaint. Moreover,
because of the nature of the Twombly litigation, either theory could have been
applied to the facts of the case. Thus, for instance, the idea that plausibility is a
measure of factual specificity can be used to explain Twombly, on the theory that
the lack of factual specificity in the complaint regarding the conspiracy between the
defendants made that allegation implausible. On the other hand, Twombly can be

150. See id. at 1324–25 (discussing his theory).
151. See infra text accompanying notes 224–40.
152. See, e.g., Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex
Litigation in the Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1997, 2045 (2010)
(arguing that the plausibility standard “applies to all types of civil actions”); Joseph A.
Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179, 179 (2010) (explaining that the
plausibility standard “applies to all civil matters”). The conclusion of many commentators
that plausibility is required in “all civil matters” is likely based on the Court’s
pronouncement in Iqbal that its “decision in Twombly should [not] be limited to pleadings
made in the context of an antitrust dispute.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
The “antitrust-only” argument which was rejected in Iqbal, however, is different than the
question that Steinman addresses, which is whether plausibility will be required for every
complaint filed in federal court. See Steinman, supra note 5, at 1298–99 (discussing his
thesis that the plausibility inquiry is not required in every dispute). The Iqbal opinion makes
clear that the plausibility requirement is transubstantive and, as such, is consistent with the
general thrust of the Federal Rules. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of
“General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 536 (explaining that the Federal Rules are
“uniformly applicable in all types of cases”); see also David Marcus, The Past, Present, and
Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 375
(2010) (arguing that only legislatures should engage in substance-specific rulemaking). That
the plausibility analysis is transubstantive, and thus cannot be limited to a particular
substantive context such as antitrust, does not mean, however, that the analysis is required
for every civil complaint. Professor Steinman was the first to recognize that plausibility,
despite being a transubstantive requirement, might nevertheless be inapplicable to a large
number of complaints filed in federal court.
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interpreted under the second theory of the relationship between factual specificity
and plausibility. Pursuant to this understanding, the Court determined that the
description of the agreement between the defendants was insufficiently fact
specific; the Court then used plausibility to determine whether the alleged parallel
conduct by the defendants justified allowing the plaintiffs to proceed despite this
deficiency in the complaint.
To support his conclusion that plausibility is a “secondary inquiry”153 which is
only triggered by other defects in the complaint, Professor Steinman relies
primarily on two points, both of which are persuasive. The first point considers the
Iqbal Court’s interpretation of the Twombly opinion. In particular, Steinman
focuses on the Iqbal Court’s introduction of a “two-step framework for evaluating
the sufficiency of a complaint.”154 According to Professor Steinman, the Iqbal
Court recognized that the plausibility analysis in Twombly was necessary only
because of other defects in the complaint, and thus developed a two-part approach
in which plausibility was the second, and possibly unnecessary, step.155 Thus, by
“taking Iqbal’s two steps seriously,”156 the plausibility analysis from Twombly is
revealed as a secondary consideration, which might be avoided in many cases. I
think Steinman’s observation is correct and important. As will be discussed more
fully below, the Iqbal Court misinterpreted Twombly with regard to the sort of
defects that should trigger the plausibility analysis. But the Iqbal Court did
correctly recognize that plausibility was not the primary inquiry at the pleadings
stage and might often be unnecessary. Thus, although the Iqbal Court erred in
conceiving the first step of the inquiry, it was correct in recognizing that
plausibility was the second (and possibly unnecessary) step in the analysis.
The second point on which Professor Steinman relies to support his conclusion
that plausibility is a secondary consideration is that “the most significant preTwombly authorities remain good law.”157 Here again, I think Professor Steinman
makes an important point. The Supreme Court had never before relied on a lack of
plausibility to justify the dismissal of a complaint. And, in doing so in Twombly, it
did not overturn any previous decisions.158 The Twombly opinion cites previous
Supreme Court decisions on pleading as if the Twombly plausibility analysis is
perfectly consistent with those decisions.159 In general, the Twombly opinion is
written as if the case is simply an application of preexisting pleading principles.
This approach is much more consistent with the notion that plausibility is a
secondary consideration which is triggered only by another defect in the complaint.
Both of Professor Steinman’s points supporting his conclusion that plausibility
is a secondary consideration support the second theory as to the relationship

153. Steinman, supra note 5, at 1314.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1314–18.
156. Id. at 1314.
157. Id. at 1320.
158. Conley’s “no set of facts” language was retired, but the case itself was not
overturned. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 139, § 72 (“Justice Souter carefully noted that
Conley itself was not being overturned . . . .”).
159. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–55 (2007) (citing various
Supreme Court cases interpreting Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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between factual specificity and plausibility, in which plausibility is only triggered
by a lack of factual specificity. There is, however, another, more obvious argument
supporting the notion that plausibility is triggered only by a lack of factual
specificity: the way in which the Twombly court used the plausibility analysis.
In describing the two different theories regarding the relationship between
factual specificity and plausibility, this Article has made the observation that under
either theory the question is whether a certain fact can be inferred. The difference
in the two theories is the source from which this inference is based. Thus, for the
first theory, in which plausibility is a tool by which the factual specificity of a
complaint is measured, the question is whether an event can be inferred from the
factual specificity with which the event is described. Stated algebraically: X1, X2,
X3 Æ X? Under the second theory, the inference as to whether the event occurred is
based on other allegations contained in the complaint. Thus: Y, ZÆ X?
Viewed from this perspective, the Twombly opinion clearly falls under the
second theory, in which plausibility is triggered only by a lack of factual specificity
and in which the plausibility analysis is used to determine whether other allegations
in the complaint infer the existence of the generically described event. In Twombly,
the plausibility analysis was used to determine whether the allegations of parallel
conduct plausibly suggested the existence of an illegal agreement amongst the
defendants: “[T]he plaintiffs assert that the [defendants’] parallel conduct was
‘strongly suggestive of conspiracy.’ . . . But it was not suggestive of conspiracy, not
if history teaches anything.”160 Using our algebraic symbols, the allegations of
parallel conduct were Y and Z. According to the Court, Y and Z did not plausibly
suggest the existence of X, the alleged illegal agreement.
When the Court addressed the lack of factual specificity in the Twombly
complaint, it did not use the term “plausibility.” The Court did not intimate that a
trial court judge should infer whether an allegation is true based on the factual
specificity with which that event is described. The entire discussion of the
complaint’s factual specificity is conducted without reference to plausibility.161 The
notice standard for measuring factual specificity from Conley is cited, but
plausibility is not mentioned.
Thus, by closely reading the Twombly opinion, one recognizes that the
plausibility analysis used by the Court was divorced from the question of the
factual specificity of the complaint. The Court detailed the lack of factual
specificity in the Twombly complaint without mentioning plausibility. And, when
the Court engaged in a plausibility analysis, it did so without regard to the question
of factual specificity. Assuming that a complaint drafted with more factual
specificity would have survived a motion to dismiss (as this Article presumes),
however, leads to the almost inescapable conclusion that the Twombly complaint’s
lack of factual specificity triggered the plausibility analysis by the Court. This
explains why the Court in Twombly wrote as if the plausibility analysis it used was
completely consistent with preexisting pleading principles: Never before had the
Court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint for lack of factual specificity. Twombly,
then, was a case of first impression. The plausibility analysis was not introduced as

160. Id. at 567.
161. Id. at 564–69.
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a new gloss on accepted pleading standards. Instead, the plausibility analysis was
the Court’s response to an issue it had never before had to address: How should a
district court proceed when a complaint has failed the test for factual specificity?
If plausibility is triggered by a lack of factual specificity, it is important to know
what is required for factual specificity under Rule 8. Alas, we are back to the
original question—factual specificity—which was part of the impetus for the
Federal Rules. Recall that the Federal Rules were, in part, a reaction to the detailed
factual specificity that some judges had required under the code pleading era. In
Conley v. Gibson,162 the Court affirmed that very little factual specificity would be
required under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.163 And then the issue mostly
went away, at least as far as the Supreme Court was concerned.164 That is, at least
until Twombly. If the plausibility analysis introduced by the Court in Twombly is
required only when the standard for factual specificity has not been met, the
Twombly case is a living, breathing example of the application of Rule 8’s standard
for factual specificity to an actual complaint. All legal commentators recognize
Twombly as an important case, but I would submit that the true import of the
opinion has been obscured in the effort to figure out plausibility.165 The Twombly
opinion is the Court’s first discussion of the factual specificity required under Rule
8 in decades. This is the most important aspect of the Twombly case. To play upon
the old cliché, all the attention regarding Twombly has been directed toward the cart
rather than the horse. And it just so happens that the horse in this case is an age-old
question—the factual specificity required for a plaintiff’s complaint—on which the
Supreme Court has been mostly silent for decades.
Unfortunately, on the question of the factual specificity required under Rule 8,
the Twombly opinion again obscures rather than enlightens. The Twombly opinion
and holding support two competing versions as to how a court should measure
whether a complaint has been drafted with sufficient factual specificity.
Unfortunately, the Iqbal Court adopted the wrong version.

162. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
163. Id. at 47 (“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set
out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.”). For a full discussion, see the text
accompanying notes 65–86.
164. The Supreme Court has periodically confirmed that the factual specificity standard
in Rule 8 did not permit a heightened pleading standard for certain substantive areas. See
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (rejecting the heightened pleading
requirement employed by the court of appeals in an employment discrimination lawsuit);
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 163
(1993) (holding that “[a] federal court may not apply a ‘heightened pleading standard’ . . . in
civil rights cases alleging municipal liability”).
165. See Catherine T. Struve, Foreword: Procedure as Palimpsest, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
421, 421 (2010) (describing the Twombly case as a “landmark pleading decision” but
comparing it to the abstract painting of Cy Twombly).
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IV. MEASURING THE FACTUAL SPECIFICITY OF A COMPLAINT: WHY IQBAL IS
WRONG
Because plausibility becomes necessary only when the complaint is deficiently
factually specific, Twombly is important for delineating what level of factual
specificity is required under Rule 8. Unfortunately, here again, the Twombly
opinion is ambiguous. There are two ways to interpret the Twombly opinion as to
how the Court reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs’ complaint had not been
drafted with sufficient factual specificity. Under the first interpretation, the
complaint was not sufficiently factually specific because it did not describe the
event on which the defendants’ liability was based with a sufficient degree of detail
and particularity. This interpretation of Twombly will be labeled as the
“transactional” understanding of the case. The other interpretation of the Twombly
opinion is that the Court determined that the complaint in that case was not
factually specific because it contained “conclusory” allegations; this will be labeled
as the “conclusory” understanding of Twombly. The conclusory understanding of
Twombly is the one adopted by the Court in Iqbal.
This Part will address the problems that arise from the Iqbal Court’s
interpretation of Twombly, in which the plausibility analysis is triggered by the
mere presence of conclusory allegations. This Part will argue that these problems
are insurmountable and that the Iqbal opinion will consequently be overturned.
A. The “Transactional” Interpretation of Twombly
The Twombly case can be read for the proposition that a complaint is sufficiently
factually specific if it provides a basic description of the transaction or event on
which the liability of the defendant is premised. The Court noted in its opinion that
the plaintiffs’ complaint “mentioned no specific time, place, or person involved in
the alleged conspiracies.”166 The Court also contrasted the bare assertion of
conspiracy in Twombly with the model form of pleading negligence accompanying
the Federal Rules, which clearly identifies the defendant, the place where the
accident occurred, and the time and date when the accident occurred.167 In short, a
transactional understanding of the factual specificity requirement in Rule 8 would
require the plaintiff to identify the who, what, when, where, and how of the event
or transaction on which the defendant’s liability is premised. More specifically, it
would require the plaintiff to identify her version of the particulars regarding the
transaction or occurrence on which the defendant’s liability is based. The Twombly
complaint failed to meet this standard.
I am not the first to propose a transactional understanding of the factual
specificity requirements of Rule 8.168 The suitability of this approach to factual

166. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 1215, at 194 (“Implicit [from
Conley’s notice pleading standard for factual specificity] is the notion that the rules do
contemplate a statement of circumstances, occurrences, and events in support of the claim
being presented.”); Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 460–61 (1943)
(“The notice in mind is rather that of the general nature of the case and the circumstances or
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specificity has, however, perhaps not been completely realized. Although the
Federal Rules contemplated that pleadings would proceed upon a more cursory
description of the underlying factual context of the dispute between the parties than
what had been allowed under code pleading, the rules accepted code pleading’s
primary premise that pleadings (and, to some extent, the law in general) should be
primarily about stories rather than legal doctrine.169 The Federal Rules, then,
always contemplated that the plaintiff’s complaint would tell a story about a realworld transaction or occurrence. In fact, the phrase “transaction or occurrence”
appears in a host of federal rules. Plaintiffs can join together in one lawsuit only if
their claims arise out of the “same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions
or occurrences.”170 Multiple defendants can be sued in the same lawsuit only if the
claims against the defendants arise out of the “same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences.”171 A defendant is required to assert a
counterclaim that “arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the opposing party’s claim.”172 Defendants (and plaintiffs) can bring
crossclaims against other defendants (and plaintiffs) only if their crossclaim “arises
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original
action.”173 A party can amend its pleading and have that pleading “relate back” to
the date of the original pleading only if the amendment arises out of the same
“conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out . . . in the original pleading.”174 Indeed,
the legal realists behind the adoption of the Federal Rules have so successfully
engrained the notion that pleadings (and, more generally, legal disputes) are, at
heart, stories about transactions or occurrences that the approach has transcended
the Federal Rules into other areas of procedure. Preclusion rules often hinge on an
analysis that incorporates the “transaction or occurrence” inquiry.175 And, in United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs,176 the Court interpreted the “case” or “controversy”
language in Article III, Section 2177 to require something very much akin to the
“transaction or occurrence” language that litters the Federal Rules.178
Considering the ubiquity of the “transaction or occurrence” analysis throughout
the rules, then, it should come as no surprise that Rule 8, which sets out the
requirements for the initial pleading that begins a lawsuit, would also incorporate
the concept. Indeed, unless a complaint describes in some detail as to the
events upon which it is based, so as to differentiate it from other acts or events, to inform the
opponent of the affair or transaction to be litigated—but not of details which he should
ascertain for himself in preparing his defense—and to tell the court of the broad outlines of
the case.”); Steinman, supra note 5, at 1334 (“A plaintiff’s complaint must provide an
adequate transactional narrative, that is, an identification of the real-world acts or events
underlying the plaintiff’s claim.”).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 19–22.
170. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1)(A).
171. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(A).
172. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)(1)(A).
173. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g).
174. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B).
175. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982).
176. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
177. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
178. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725 (“The state and federal claims must derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact.”).
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transaction or event being sued upon, some of the other rules that depend on an
identification of the relevant transaction or event might be difficult to apply. For
example, a defendant considering whether he is required to assert a counterclaim
against a plaintiff will need to know the transaction or occurrence that is the basis
of the plaintiff’s suit. The entire structure of the rules is organized according to
“transactions or occurrences.” If the plaintiff fails to identify with sufficient
specificity the transaction or occurrence that is the basis of her suit, the rules do not
work properly.
Of course, concluding that a transactional approach to the factual specificity
question is proper is only a start in developing a comprehensive understanding of
exactly how much specificity is required and which events must be factually
described in the plaintiff’s complaint. It advances the inquiry beyond Conley’s
initial formulation of the test for factual specificity by providing an answer to the
“Notice of what?” question. However, the ultimate proof, as they say, is in the
pudding—in how the test is applied. The plaintiffs in Twombly were suing on an
event or transaction—the alleged agreement between the defendants to engage in
parallel business behavior—that they were unable to describe with any specificity.
Under a transactional understanding of the notice test for factual specificity,
Twombly’s complaint was obviously deficient.
B. The “Conclusory” Interpretation of Twombly
Although the transactional understanding of Twombly can be used to explain the
resort to plausibility in that case, there is another “plausible” reading of how the
Court reached that conclusion in Twombly. Pursuant to this understanding, the
resort to plausibility was necessary in Twombly because the complaint included
conclusory allegations. This is how the Iqbal Court read the Twombly opinion, and
this was the critical error made by the Iqbal Court.
The Iqbal litigation was initiated by several individuals who had been arrested
and detained by federal officials in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks.179 The litigation involved numerous claims asserted by two plaintiffs
against multiple defendants.180 As the litigation proceeded to the Supreme Court,
however, only the claims made by Iqbal against John Ashcroft and Robert Mueller
were under consideration.181 These claims centered on the policies adopted by the
federal government regarding the confinement of an arrestee designated as a
“person of high interest” to the post-September 11th investigation.182 The
complaint alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller had been involved in shaping this
policy and that their involvement had been fueled by an unconstitutional
discriminatory animus.183

179. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded sub nom. Iqbal v.
Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007).
180. Id.
181. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 (2009).
182. Id. at 1944.
183. Id.
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Defendants Ashcroft and Mueller moved to dismiss the claims against them on
the basis of qualified immunity.184 The district court denied their motion.185
Defendants Ashcroft and Mueller took an interlocutory appeal of this decision to
the Second Circuit.186 While the case was pending before the Second Circuit,
however, the Twombly decision was rendered by the Supreme Court.187 The Second
Circuit considered the applicability of Twombly to the case,188 but nevertheless
affirmed the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss.189
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Iqbal’s “complaint fail[ed] to
plead sufficient facts to state a claim for purposeful and unlawful discrimination
against [Ashcroft and Mueller].”190 The Court’s decision was based on the
complaint’s failure to comply with the plausibility rubric introduced in Twombly,
which the Court described as consisting of a “two-pronged approach.”191 The Iqbal
Court’s description of the “two-pronged approach” involving plausibility is
consistent with the understanding of Twombly advanced in Part II of this Article.
The Iqbal Court understood that the resort to plausibility in Twombly was necessary
only because the Twombly complaint was deficient in other regards. The Iqbal
Court noted that had the “Court simply credited the allegation of a conspiracy [in
Twombly], the plaintiffs would have stated a claim for relief and been entitled to
proceed perforce.”192 In other words, the Iqbal Court recognized that the resort to
plausibility in Twombly was necessary only because the plaintiffs’ allegation of a
conspiracy was somehow defective and thus was “not entitled to the assumption of
truth.”193
The critical question is why the allegation of conspiracy in Twombly was not
entitled to the presumption of truth and thus subject to the plausibility analysis.
According to the Iqbal Court, the defect in the Twombly complaint was that the
allegation of conspiracy was a “legal conclusion”194 or a “conclusory
statement[].”195 Because the complaint in Iqbal was also conclusory, and in this
sense was similar to the Twombly complaint, the Iqbal Court proceeded to
plausibility in Iqbal as it had done in Twombly.196

184. Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *10.
185. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944.
186. Id. On appeal, the United States settled plaintiff Elmaghraby’s claims for $300,000.
Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 2007).
187. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1954.
191. Id. at 1950.
192. Id.
193. See id. at 1951.
194. Id. at 1950.
195. Id. at 1949.
196. See id. at 1949–51.
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C. What Makes an Allegation Conclusory?
Before explaining the problems that arise from the Iqbal Court’s “conclusory”
reading of Twombly, it is imperative to have a working definition of what is meant
by the term “conclusory.” This Section will address that issue. This is not an easy
task,197 as the term “conclusory” is not generally recognized or used outside of
legal circles.198 Even within the legal community, the term is often associated with
different concepts. Indeed, the Iqbal and Twombly opinions use a variety of
different terms in describing the deficiency of the allegations in those cases: “legal
conclusions,”199 “conclusory statements,”200 “conclusions,”201 “bare assertions,”202
conclusory allegations,203 and “nonconclusory factual allegation.”204 This
smorgasbord of terms, however, obfuscates two distinct principles operating within
this pleading vocabulary: legal conclusions and conclusory factual allegations.205

197. Brown, supra note 6, at 1286 (“Defining conclusory is a difficult task . . . .”).
198. See Gertrude Block, ‘Conclusory’ v. ‘Conclusionary,’ PA. LAW, Jan.–Feb. 1999, at
53 (“A search of both law and lay dictionaries revealed a surprising fact: Neither conclusory
nor conclusionary is listed in Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (Third Edition), Black’s Law
Dictionary (Fifth Edition), Words and Phrases, The American Heritage Dictionary (Second
College Edition), or Webster’s New Third International Dictionary (Unabridged).”); Eugene
Volokh, Conclusory, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 16, 2007, 1:41 PM),
http://volokh.com/2007/05/16/conclusory/ (discussing how the term “conclusory” is only
used in legal circles and how that term is used within the legal community). The Wyoming
Supreme Court was so disturbed that the term “conclusory” is used only within legal
language that it thought it necessary to confirm the suitability of the term: “After painstaking
deliberation, we have decided that we like the word ‘conclusory,’ and we are distressed by
its omission from the English language. We now proclaim that henceforth ‘conclusory’ is
appropriately used in the opinions of this court.”). Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079,
1086 n.3 (Wyo. 1987).
199. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564.
200. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
201. Id. at 1950; see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 552.
202. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
203. Id. (“As such, the allegations are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true.”).
204. Id. at 1950.
205. The discussion of legal conclusions and conclusory factual allegations in this Article
is not intended as a thorough account of the myriad issues related to the distinction made
within our legal system between questions of fact and questions of law. For instance,
decision-making authority at the trial court level is usually divided based on the distinction
between questions of fact and questions of law. LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG,
BASIC CONTRACT LAW 593 (6th ed. 1996) (“It is commonly said that questions of fact are for
the jury and questions of law are for the judge. A more realistic analysis would be that
questions the legal system assigns to the jury are called ‘questions of fact,’ and questions the
legal system assigns to the judge are called ‘questions of law.’” (emphasis in original)). The
relationship between a district court’s judgment and the ability of an appellate court to
review that decision depends on whether the appellant is asking the appellate court to review
a question of law or fact. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695–700 (1996)
(discussing the appropriate standard of review of a district court’s legal and factual
conclusions within the context of a probable cause determination). Even more mundane
questions, such as the permissible scope of an expert’s testimony at trial and the appropriate
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1. Legal Conclusions
Legal conclusions are determinations about the legal effect of certain facts.206 As
such, they fall squarely within the province of a judge rather than the fact finder.207
To demonstrate, consider a statute that restricts vehicles from parks, and assume
that a plaintiff has brought suit and alleged that the defendant was riding a bicycle
in a park. Whether the statute applies to the bicycle rider is a legal conclusion. That
the defendant was riding a bicycle is a factual question, of course. But the legal
effect of that bicycle riding (whether the statute applies to this conduct) is a legal
question that must be answered by a judge. The answer to this legal question is a
legal conclusion.
Because legal conclusions involve questions of law for a judge to decide, when
a legal conclusion is stated in a pleading (such as a complaint), it is irrelevant
except as to serve notice to the judge as to a particular legal argument being pressed
by a party litigant.208 The judge is obviously not bound by the legal conclusions or
content of an interrogatory discovery request, can depend on the law-fact distinction. See
O’Brien v. International Brotherhood. of Electrical Workers, 443 F. Supp. 1182, 1187–88
(N.D. Ga. 1977) (considering whether interrogatories were permissible by distinguishing
whether the interrogatory called for a fact, a pure question of law, or a mixed question of law
and fact). See generally Jill Wieber Lens, The (Overlooked) Consequence of Easing the
Prohibition of Expert Legal Testimony in Professional Negligence Claims, 48 U. LOUISVILLE
L. REV. 53, 55–60 (2009) (explaining the traditional prohibition against expert testimony
regarding questions of law). Rather, the purpose of this Article is simply to consider this
larger issue within the specific context of pleading.
206. Legal conclusions also arise within the context of pure questions of law. A pure
question of law is a legal issue whose resolution does not depend on the facts of a particular
dispute between litigants. Kira A. Davis, Note, Judicial Estoppel and Inconsistent Positions
of Law Applied to Fact and Pure Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 191, 201 (2003) (defining a pure
issue of law as a “legal issue[] unrelated to the facts of the case”). This Article will focus on
the legal conclusions that depend upon the existence of particular facts, as these types of
legal conclusions are more easily confused with the allegations of fact that were involved in
Twombly and Iqbal. See infra text accompanying notes 216–20.
207. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 9B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2521, at 219 (3d ed. 2011) (“[T]he general proposition remains true: rules of
law are for the court to enforce.”); Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Questions
of Fact Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1125, 1127–28 (2003) (“[C]ourts in
both England and the United States have generally assumed that the jury’s primary function
is to decide questions of fact, while judges may permissibly decide questions of law.”). Of
course, there are exceptions to this principle. See 21A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH
W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5052, at 249 (2d ed. 2005) (“[T]he
jury can decide many questions of law . . . .”).
208. See Clark, supra note 97, at 192 (“You don’t plead malicious prosecution, you don’t
plead false imprisonment, you just say what plaintiff and defendant did, what happened.
Then it is for the court to put on any legal labels that are needed. If the parties do give such
labels, that’s just a way of being helpful. So if the pleader wants to tell us a little theory,
that’s all right, but it’s not binding.”). Some commentators have even suggested that a legal
conclusion should not be included in a complaint. See Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths
About Twombly-Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1337, 1355 (2010) (“[A] plaintiff should
not even be alleging law.”). Although I agree with the thrust of Clermont’s point, I believe
that legal conclusions in a complaint can alert the judge to a particular legal theory on which
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arguments that are asserted in a complaint. Thus, in the example above, if the
pleading had stated that “On January 15, 2009, defendant was riding a bicycle in
Central Park and was thus operating a vehicle in the park,” a judge evaluating the
sufficiency of that complaint would not be required to defer to the legal conclusion
that a bicycle constitutes a vehicle under the state. Of course, the judge would have
to assume the truth of the specifically pleaded fact that the defendant was riding a
bicycle in Central Park. But, as to the legal questions raised by the complaint, the
legal argument made in the pleading is not entitled to deference.
The litigation culminating in the Supreme Court’s decision in Haddle v.
Garrison further demonstrates this basic proposition.209 In Haddle, the plaintiff
sued under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 after he was terminated from his
employment.210 The main legal question in the litigation was whether an at-will
employment relationship qualified as “property” under the statute.211 The district
court had concluded that an at-will employee did not have a property interest under
the statute in his employment relationship.212 The district court reached this
conclusion despite language in the plaintiff’s complaint stating that the plaintiff
“had been deprived of a property interest under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.”213
The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the district court’s dismissal of the
complaint, based on the Court’s conclusion that the statute did include at-will
employment relationships within the term “property.”214 The language in the
complaint that the plaintiff had been deprived of property under the statute,
however, was completely irrelevant to the legal analysis performed by the district
court and the Supreme Court. That the plaintiff had been terminated and had been
an at-will employee were not in dispute in Haddle; the issue in the litigation was as
to the legal effect of those agreed-upon facts. The complaint’s assertion that these
facts entitled the plaintiff to relief under the statute was perhaps helpful to the
district court in identifying the plaintiff’s legal theory for relief; but, obviously,
neither the district court nor the Supreme Court was in any way bound by the
complaint’s legal conclusion in performing the legal task of interpreting the statute.
Neither of the problematic allegations in Twombly and Iqbal were legal
conclusions, despite the Court’s occasional use of this term in both Twombly and
Iqbal. As will be explained below, the drafters in both Twombly and Iqbal clearly
intended to make factual assertions rather than legal conclusions, and the Court
recognized this characteristic of the allegations in both cases.215

the plaintiff is going to rely in the litigation. In this sense, then, a legal conclusion within a
complaint can be helpful, and there is no real harm when a complaint contains a legal
conclusion.
209. 525 U.S. 121 (1998).
210. Id. at 122–23.
211. Id. at 125.
212. Id. at 121.
213. Id. at 123.
214. See id. at 125–26.
215. See infra text accompanying notes 216–20.
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2. Conclusory Factual Allegation
A conclusory factual allegation, as compared to a legal conclusion, is an
assertion about something that occurred in the real world. A conclusory factual
allegation operates within the larger category of factual allegations. What
distinguishes a conclusory factual allegation is that it is an allegation of fact based
on inferences from other facts but whose actual existence is nevertheless doubted
by the audience considering the allegation. Broken down into separate elements,
then, a conclusory factual allegation is (1) an allegation of fact (2) based on
inferences from other facts (3) whose inferential value is doubted by the audience.
Stated in algebraic terms, a conclusory factual allegation arises when Party A
alleges Fact 1 because of the existence of Fact 2, but Party B doubts the inference
of Fact 1 from Fact 2.
(1) “An Allegation of Fact”
A conclusory factual allegation differs from a legal conclusion included within a
complaint in that it is intended as an assertion about an event that occurred in the
real world rather than the legal effect of that occurrence.216 In some instances, it can
be difficult to distinguish between the two.217 To demonstrate, consider the
Supreme Court’s decision in Papasan v. Allain,218 which was quoted in both
Twombly219 and Iqbal.220 In Papasan, the Court grappled with the plaintiffs’
assertion that they “had been denied their right to a minimally adequate
education.”221 This allegation could be viewed as either a legal conclusion or a

216. Within the context of criminal procedure, the Supreme Court has sometimes referred
to questions regarding the actual events in dispute as historical facts. See Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (“The principal components of a determination of
reasonable suspicion or probable cause will be the events which occurred leading up to the
stop or search, and then the decision whether these historical facts . . . amount to reasonable
suspicion or to probable cause.”). Other commentators sometimes refer to “what happened?”
factual questions as pure questions of fact. See Patricia J. Kaeding, Clearly Erroneous
Review of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact: The Likelihood of Confusion Determination in
Trademark Law, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1291, 1296–97 (1992) (“Where, however, a
determination is neither a question of pure fact nor clearly a question of law, an appellate
court must decide whether to treat it as law or fact for purposes of review.”).
217. This was the “conclusion” of Charles Clark. See CLARK, supra note 24, at 231
(discussing the “illusory nature of the distinctions between facts, law, and evidence”); id. (“It
should further be noted that the attempted distinction between facts, law, and evidence,
viewed as anything other than a convenient distinction of degree, seems philosophically and
logically unsound.”); see also Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the
Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 891 (2009) (describing as “hopeless” the
distinctions made within the code pleading era between “allegations of ultimate fact, legal
conclusions, and evidentiary facts”).
218. 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (concluding that, on a motion to dismiss, courts “are not
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
219. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
220. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
221. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 285.
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factual allegation. If the lawyer who drafted the complaint intended to make a
descriptive claim as to the education received by his clients, it was a factual
allegation. If, however, the intent was to argue that the funding disparity amongst
school districts in Mississippi, which had been described in the complaint, should
be deemed a violation of the right to a “minimally adequate education,”222 the
complaint’s allegation was simply a legal conclusion. The Supreme Court,
considering the location of the allegation within the overall context of the
complaint, determined that the drafter of the complaint intended to assert only a
legal conclusion rather than a factual assertion.223
Because it can sometimes be difficult to ascertain whether a pleader has
intended to make a factual statement or a legal conclusion,224 some commentators
have resolved that there is no difference between the two.225 This is an analytical
mistake.226 Simply because it might sometimes be difficult to distinguish between
the two does not mean that there is not a clear difference between them.227 The

222. Id.
223. Id. at 285–86. The Court made the same interpretive judgment about the plaintiff’s
complaint in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). In Dura, the
plaintiffs’ complaint, which asserted a securities fraud claim, was dismissed by the district
court. Id. at 338–40. In order to win at trial on this claim, the plaintiff would have needed to
prove the elements of “economic loss” and “loss causation.” Id. at 341–42. The plaintiffs’
complaint alleged that the defendant had made misrepresentations regarding the possible
future approval of a new asthmatic spray device, and that when the company announced that
the spray device would not be approved the “share price temporarily fell but almost fully
recovered within one week.” Id. at 339. The plaintiffs’ complaint also included the following
allegation: “‘In reliance on the integrity of the market, the plaintiffs . . . paid artificially
inflated prices for Dura securities’ and the plaintiffs suffered ‘damages’ thereby.” Id. at 340.
The Court interpreted the allegation alleging “damages” as a legal conclusion:
The statement implies that the plaintiffs’ loss consisted of the ‘artificially
inflated’ purchase ‘prices.’ The complaint’s failure to claim that Dura’s share
price fell significantly after the truth became known suggests that the plaintiffs
considered the allegation of purchase price inflation alone sufficient. The
complaint contains nothing that suggests otherwise.
Id. at 347. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the Court disagreed with this legal conclusion:
“[T]he ‘artificially inflated purchase price’ is not itself a relevant economic loss.” Id.
224. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 46, at 466 (“The line between scrutiny of legal
conclusions and scrutiny of factual conclusions is often obscure, however.”).
225. See supra notes 210–14 and accompanying text.
226. As my Civil Procedure professor, Sam Issacharoff, used to say (paraphrasing): “That
the ocean is aqua, and neither clearly blue nor green, does not mean that the grass is not
green nor the sky blue.”
227. It must be remembered that most of the conclusions by Clark and others who appear
to reject the division between factual and legal assertions were formed as a reaction to code
pleading. Code pleading dismissed complaints that were drafted with either too much, or too
little, factual specificity. See YEAZELL, supra note 20, at 357 (“Courts [under Code pleading]
held some complaints too detailed—and rejected them for pleading ‘mere evidence’; others
were rejected because, cast at a higher level of generality, they stated ‘conclusions,’ a flaw
equally fatal under the Codes.”). Thus, these opinions were specifically addressed at the
distinction made during the Code pleading era between facts pleaded with the right amount
of specificity and those pleaded too specifically or too generally, and the terms that courts
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difficulty is in ascertaining the intent of the drafter. This inherent difficulty in
surmising intent, however, should not blur the division between these two distinct
concepts.
In any event, in most instances it is clear whether the drafter intended to make a
factual assertion or legal conclusion. For instance, the problematic allegations in
both Twombly and Iqbal were obviously factual assertions, despite language in both
opinions describing the allegations as legal conclusions. In Twombly, the “bare
assertion”228 that a conspiracy or agreement had occurred was a factual assertion
about an event which had occurred in the real world. The plaintiffs were not certain
that this real-world event had actually transpired, and thus qualified their factual
assertion by asserting it only “upon information and belief.”229 A competent lawyer
would not assert a legal conclusion “upon information and belief.” Furthermore, the
notion that parallel behavior was alone sufficient for liability had already been
firmly rejected in preexisting antitrust case law.230 Thus, there was no reason for
the plaintiffs’ lawyers in Twombly to draft a complaint that drew the legal
conclusion of liability under the Sherman Act merely from the existence of parallel
behavior. In Iqbal, the allegation that the defendants had adopted a policy “solely
on account of”231 discriminatory reasons was also a factual assertion.232 The
drafters of the Iqbal complaint clearly intended to allege something that they
believed had occurred in the real world: that the defendants had acted on the basis
of a discriminatory purpose.

had used to express these admittedly amorphous concepts. Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel H.
Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 518,
520–21 (1957) (discussing how the courts during the Code pleading era used the terms
“ultimate facts, evidence, and conclusions” when discussing the question of factual
specificity). Apart from the question of the specificity with which factual allegations are
drawn, however, is the more basic question of whether the allegation involves an assertion of
fact or law. I believe this distinction is clearer, and that most of the comments by
commentators such as Clark and others that appear to reject this distinction are actually
directed to the separate, and less clear, question of the factual specificity of a factual
allegation. And, in any event, the division of labor within our civil justice system requires
that this distinction between assertions of law and fact be made. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. VII
(“[i]n Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried
by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.”); see Hartnett, supra note 4, at 488–89 (“So long as there is
a motion that accepts the truth of a pleader’s factual allegations and tests for their legal
sufficiency, courts must distinguish between factual and legal allegations. And so long as
there is a motion designed to test the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim, courts cannot be
bound to treat a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true.”).
228. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
229. Id. at 551 (quoting Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at ¶ 51,
Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02 CIV. 10220).
230. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (holding
that parallel conduct is not sufficient for liability under the Sherman Act); Theatre Enters.,
Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954) (same).
231. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (quoting Complaint at ¶ 96, Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937 (No. 07-1015)).
232. Cf. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (“Treating issues of intent
as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.”).
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(2) “Based on Inferences from Other Facts”
Another characteristic of a conclusory factual allegation is that it infers one fact
from the existence of other facts. When a plaintiff makes a conclusory factual
allegation, the plaintiff is conceding that he or she has no independent, firsthand
knowledge of that factual allegation. Rather than describing the factual allegation
directly, then, the plaintiff wishes to infer the fact from the existence of other facts
on which the plaintiff does have firsthand knowledge.
Outside the context of pleading, the process of inferring facts from the existence
of other facts is usually associated with the term “circumstantial evidence.” 233
Thus, consider a case in which the plaintiff wishes to establish that the defendant
was talking on a cell phone at the time of an automobile accident between the
plaintiff and the defendant. If the plaintiff directly saw the defendant talking on the
phone (or has another witness to this behavior), the plaintiff (or witness) can testify
as to that fact. If, however, the plaintiff did not directly see the defendant talking on
the phone, she might wish to prove this fact by circumstantial evidence. If the
defendant’s cell phone log showed that the defendant had placed or received a call
immediately before the accident, this record could be used as circumstantial
evidence to show that the defendant had been talking on the phone at the time of
the accident.
Put in algebraic terms, then, a conclusory factual allegation will follow an
established pattern, wherein Fact A is presumed from the existence of Facts B and
C. The problematic allegations in both Twombly and Iqbal fall into this pattern. In
Twombly, the plaintiffs alleged that a conspiracy or agreement had occurred, not
because they had directly perceived this agreement, but because of the existence of
the parallel business behavior of the defendants. In Iqbal, the plaintiffs believed
that the defendants had acted with a discriminatory purpose because of the
existence of large numbers of Arab-Muslim men who had been arrested as part of
the investigation of the terrorists’ attacks of 9/11 and because of their belief that no
penological reason could explain the defendants’ policies.
(3) “Whose Inferential Value Is Doubted by the Audience”
For an allegation of fact to be “conclusory,” it is also necessary that the
“audience” doubt the inferential link that the speaker (the pleader) believes
exists.234 The term “conclusory,” then, represents an opinion as to whether the

233. See 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF
ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA § 25 (2d ed. 1923) (distinguishing
between testimonial evidence and circumstantial evidence and defining the latter as “all
offered evidentiary facts not being assertions from which the truth of the matters asserted is
desired to be inferred”).
234. See Block, supra note 198, at 53 (“Both conclusory and conclusionary, in current
legal usage, describe a conclusion reached without adequate proof or evidence.”);
Conclusory Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/conclusory (defining conclusory as “consisting of or relating to a
conclusion or assertion for which no supporting evidence is offered”).
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alleged fact follows from the supporting facts. It is a pejorative term. A person
drafting a complaint does not believe the inferences made in the complaint are
“conclusory.” Rather, the pleader believes that the existence of Facts B and C
“conclusively” establish the existence of Fact A. To somebody who disagrees with
the factual inferences, however, the factual allegations are “conclusory.” The
audience doubts the inferential link between Facts B and C to Fact A, and thus
labels their relationship as “conclusory.” The term conclusory will only arise in the
context of pleadings, then, when the person reading the pleading disagrees with the
factual inferences that the pleader believes are warranted. One person’s “warranted
conclusion” is another’s “conclusory allegation.” Because the determination of
whether certain facts follow from other facts is based on real-world experience and
observation, it should come as no surprise that people will frequently disagree as to
whether an inference is warranted or “conclusory.”235
D. The Error of Iqbal’s “Conclusory” Interpretation of Twombly
Using the working definitions established in the previous section, the problems
stemming from Iqbal’s interpretation of Twombly, in which plausibility is triggered
by the existence of “conclusory allegations,” become evident. There are three. First,
the existence of conclusory allegations cannot rationally serve as a trigger for the
plausibility analysis because the determinations as to whether an allegation is
“conclusory” or “plausible” are analytically one in the same. Second, determining
whether an allegation is sufficiently factually specific by asking whether that
allegation is conclusory is fundamentally flawed because the two are not
necessarily related. A conclusory allegation might be drafted with insufficient
factual specificity, as was the case in Twombly. However, an allegation might be
conclusory yet also be drafted with all possible factual specificity; this was true of
the allegation of discriminatory intent in Iqbal. Asking whether an allegation is
conclusory is thus a poor proxy for whether that allegation is factually specific.
Third (and this is related to the second point), if plausibility is triggered merely by
the existence of conclusory allegations, as Iqbal holds, this principle cannot be
reconciled with Supreme Court precedent. The Court had never before suggested
that the presence of conclusory allegations require an analysis of the plausibility of
those allegations. In fact, in cases such as Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,236 the Court
had soundly affirmed that conclusory allegations are not problematic. The best
interpretation of the Iqbal opinion is not that the Court intended to overrule cases
such as Swierkiewicz, but rather that the Court was bewildered by the nebulous
Twombly opinion. Once the chaos from the Twombly opinion is resolved (and

235. See Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105
MICH. L. REV. 241, 243 (2006) (explaining that in evaluating the weight to be given
circumstantial evidence “the jury must use its experience with people and events in weighing
the probabilities”). Professor Heller makes the interesting empirical point that both
testimonial and circumstantial evidence require the jury to rely on their own experiences in
determining how much weight should be given to that evidence, but that jurors consistently
undervalue circumstantial evidence and overvalue testimonial evidence. See id. at 244. The
Twombly and Iqbal opinions seem to share the bias discussed by Professor Heller.
236. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
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hopefully this Article contributes to that effort), the Court will turn its back on the
Iqbal decision.
1. Plausibility and Conclusory: A Circular Problem
The first problem with using the existence of conclusory allegations as a trigger
for the plausibility analysis is that, within the context of pleadings, the
determination that an allegation is conclusory is the same as the determination that
the allegation is not plausible. In other words, to say that an allegation is
conclusory is not analytically different than saying that the allegation is not
plausible, at least in the manner the term “plausibility” was used in both Twombly
and Iqbal. Both terms reflect the same concept, which is that the reader doubts the
actual occurrence of an event that the pleader has inferred from other facts.237 To
use one as a trigger for the other is redundant or circular.
To demonstrate, consider the Twombly facts. According to the Iqbal Court, the
allegation of conspiracy in the Twombly complaint was conclusory.238 Using the
definitional framework outlined above, the Court thus interpreted the allegation of
a conspiracy to be a factual statement that the plaintiffs had inferred from the
existence of other, directly observable facts. To attach the pejorative “conclusory”
label to this allegation, however, it was necessary for the Court to make a judgment
as to whether it believed the factual allegation of conspiracy followed from the
directly perceived instances of parallel conduct. The Court did not. As detailed
above, the allegation of a conspiracy in Twombly would not have been
“conclusory” if the Court believed that conspiracy followed from parallel behavior.
The plausibility analysis, however, retraces this same pattern of thinking. Earlier
in this Article, I closely examined the Court’s plausibility analysis in Twombly.239 It
was determined that, in conducting the plausibility analysis in Twombly, the Court
was considering whether the allegations of parallel conduct implied a conspiracy.240
The Iqbal decision falls into the same pattern. In Iqbal, the Court determined
that the plaintiffs’ allegations of discriminatory intent were “conclusory.”241 The
Court did not explicitly explain why these allegations were conclusory. 242

237. According to this author’s perception of how the two terms are commonly used,
they might be slightly different (on a quantitative level) in the level of doubt that they serve
to indicate. For instance, a reader might believe an allegation is “conclusory” yet also
“plausible.” It is not that there is any qualitative difference in the analysis required to reach
those separate conclusions; rather, it is that the term “conclusory” is used to indicate general
doubt about the inference being considered while the term “implausible” is reserved only for
those inferences which are highly unlikely. Thus, if a reader believed that an inference
contained in an allegation was forty percent likely, he might label it “conclusory” yet also
“plausible.” However, if the reader believed the inferential allegation only five percent
likely, it might be both “conclusory” and “implausible.” Even if there is a slight quantitative
difference between the terms, however, they still represent the same kind of analytical
process and it is illogical for one to serve as the “trigger” for the other.
238. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 145–65.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 147–48.
241. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
242. Id.
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However, the clear inference which can be drawn from the opinion is that the Iqbal
Court found the allegations of discriminatory intent to be conclusory because the
plaintiff had not directly observed this fact, and the Court doubted that the fact
could be inferred by the directly perceivable facts contained in the Iqbal complaint.
Simply stated, the Court doubted that the defendants’ discriminatory intent could
be inferred from the fact that a high proportion of Arabs and Muslims had been
involved in the investigative roundup after the 9/11 tragedy. But, the plausibility
analysis involved the same analytical inquiry of determining whether certain facts
could be inferred from others.
To state that a conclusory allegation triggers the plausibility analysis, then, is
akin to saying that the defendant’s negligent behavior triggers an analysis of
whether the defendant acted reasonably. The reasoning is circular.
There is a response to this problem. Although I think the definition given to the
word “conclusory” in this Article is consistent with how that term is generally used
within legal jargon, it is possible that the Court intended something slightly
different when it used the term in Twombly and Iqbal. In equating the allegations of
discriminatory intent in Iqbal to the allegations of a conspiracy in Twombly, the
Court most likely intended to stress that each allegation was based not on the
events that had been directly perceived but rather on inferences from events that
had been directly perceived. Thus, in Twombly, the plaintiffs had not directly
perceived the conspiracy event on which the defendants’ liability was premised, but
they had inferred that such an event had actually occurred because of inferences the
plaintiffs had drawn from the directly perceived parallel conduct. Similarly, in
Iqbal, the plaintiffs sought to infer the defendants’ discriminatory intent from the
directly perceived real-world event involving the post-9/11 investigation and the
proportion of Arabs and Muslims who had been detained in this process. In both
Twombly and Iqbal, then, the critical allegation followed a certain pattern, which
was that the alleged conduct of the defendant had not been directly perceived but
instead had been inferred by the plaintiffs because of other facts.243 Using the threestep definition of a “conclusory factual allegation” described above, the allegations
in both Twombly and Iqbal were (1) factual assertions that were (2) based on
inferences from other facts. Excluding the third part of the definition of
“conclusory” explained above—that the reader doubts the inference asserted by the
pleader—solves the circular problem that arises when conclusory allegations
trigger the plausibility analysis. Under this massaged definition of “conclusory,”
then, the plausibility analysis is triggered by the existence of factual assertions that
are based on inferences rather than on directly perceived events. The Court then
evaluated the inferences made by the complaint; those that the Court finds
convincing are labeled “plausible” while those that are unconvincing are labeled
“conclusory.”

243. Commentator Stephen Brown, in his insightful article, Reconstructing Pleading:
Twombly, Iqbal, and the Limited Role of the Plausibility Inquiry, advocates for a definition
of conclusory that is very similar to the massaged version discussed in the text. See Brown,
supra note 6, at 1288–92 (determining that conclusory allegations are allegations about an
event that is only indirectly perceptible or an event that is directly perceptible but pleaded
indirectly).
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2. The Disconnect Between Conclusory Allegations and Factually Specific
Allegations
Although the “circular” problem discussed above can be resolved by massaging
the term “conclusory” in a way that departs from its commonly used meaning,
problems that are more fundamental exist if the plausibility analysis is triggered
merely by the presence of conclusory allegations. The first of these problems is that
there is no necessary correlation between an allegation that is conclusory and an
allegation that is factually specific. To use one as a measure (or proxy) for the
other, then, is an analytically flawed approach. As the adage goes: “To get a correct
answer you have to ask the right question.” The Iqbal approach, in which the
factual specificity question is answered by asking whether an allegation is
conclusory, is destined to sometimes give the wrong answer because it asks the
wrong question.
The Twombly and Iqbal cases demonstrate that there is no necessary link
between the factual specificity with which an allegation is made and whether that
allegation is “conclusory.” In Twombly, the complaint alleged that an agreement or
conspiracy had occurred based on the circumstantial evidence of parallel business
behavior.244 Because the allegation of conspiracy in Twombly was asserted based
on the existence of other facts (the parallel business behavior), it fits under the
massaged definition of a conclusory factual allegation discussed in the previous
Section. In addition to being conclusory, the allegation of conspiracy in Twombly
was not as factually specific as it could have been. It was possible to describe the
agreement or conspiracy with more factual detail, and a hypothetical complaint
with this degree of factual specificity was discussed earlier in this Article. Thus, the
allegation in Twombly was both conclusory and lacking in factual specificity.
The allegation of discriminatory intent in Iqbal was conclusory in the same
manner that the allegation of conspiracy in Twombly was conclusory. Like the
conspiracy allegation in Twombly, the allegation of discriminatory intent involved
in Iqbal was asserted by the plaintiffs based on the existence of other facts that the
plaintiffs believed implied a discriminatory motive by the defendants, namely, the
disproportionate number of Arabs and Muslims who had been involved with the
federal government’s post-September 11th investigation.245 Although the
problematic allegations in both Twombly and Iqbal qualify as conclusory factual
allegations, they are different with regard to whether they were drafted with the
requisite degree of factual specificity. Although the allegation of conspiracy in
Twombly could have been drafted with more factual specificity, the allegation of

244. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007) (“The nub of the
complaint, then, is the [defendants’] parallel behavior . . . and its sufficiency turns on the
suggestions raised by this conduct when viewed in light of common economic experience.”).
245. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (“The complaint alleges that ‘the FBI, under the
direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim
men . . . as part of its investigation of the events of September 11.’ It further claims that ‘the
policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of
confinement until they were “cleared” by the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT
and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.’” (capitalization in
original)).
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discriminatory intent in Iqbal could not have been drafted with any more precision.
A person’s state of mind (including a discriminatory intent) is definitely a factual
question,246 but it is not an “event or transaction” and cannot be described any more
specifically (absent a ridiculous discussion of brain neurons, synapses, and
endorphins) other than to say that the state of mind does, or does not, exist. It is a
reason or explanation for a real-world phenomenon, and in this sense is a species of
causation inquiry,247 but it is not something susceptible to precise description.248
The allegation of agreement or conspiracy in Twombly was also about a particular
state of mind, but because humans cannot communicate other than by external,
physical acts,249 the agreement or conspiracy amongst the defendants required realworld events or transactions.
Thus, Iqbal’s focus on the existence of conclusory allegations is analytically
flawed because this inquiry does not address the fundamental question of whether
the complaint has been drafted with sufficient factual specificity. This analytical
flaw, however, is not just a theoretical problem—it creates serious tension with
Supreme Court precedent. In fact, the Court’s treatment of the conclusory
allegations in Iqbal simply cannot be reconciled with Court precedent previously
considering conclusory allegations of discriminatory intent.
3. Conclusory Allegations and Supreme Court Precedent
Although Iqbal’s “conclusory” interpretation of Twombly would suggest that the
mere presence of conclusory allegations triggers the plausibility analysis, the Court
has never before indicated that a complaint’s inclusion of conclusory allegations is
problematic. In fact, in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. (decided only seven years
prior to Iqbal), the Court specifically addressed a challenge to a conclusory
allegation of discriminatory intent, indistinguishable from the one asserted in Iqbal,
and concluded that the allegation was sufficient regardless of whether the district
court believed the allegation was likely to be “plausible” or true.250

246. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (“Treating issues of intent
as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.”).
247. See Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Reasons, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 189, 190–92
(1999) (“Intentional human conduct . . . unlike other phenomena, can be explained by . . .
reasons for action. Although physical causes explain the movements of galaxies and planets,
molecules, infrahuman species, and all the other moving parts of the physical universe, only
human action can also be explained by reasons. It makes no sense to ask a bull that gores a
matador, ‘Why did you do that?,’ but this question makes sense and is vitally important
when it is addressed to a person who sticks a knife into the chest of another human being. It
makes a great difference to us if the knife-wielder is a surgeon who is cutting with the
patient’s consent or a person who is enraged at the victim and intends to kill him.”).
248. The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seemed to understand that a
person’s state of mind is not susceptible to a more particular description when they excluded
“conditions of a person’s mind” from the heightened particularity requirements of Rule 9.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
249. See Daryl J. Bem & Charles Honorton, Does Psi Exist? Replicable Evidence for an
Anomalous Process of Information Transfer, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL., no. 1, 1994 at 4–18
(describing general scientific doubt regarding “ESP”).
250. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
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In Swierkiewicz, a plaintiff sued his employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 alleging that he had been fired on account of his national origin.251 The
district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff “had not
adequately alleged circumstances that support an inference of discrimination.”252
This decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit under circuit precedent holding
that, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege the facts that he
will ultimately have to provide evidence of after the discovery stage in order to
avoid summary judgment.253 The Supreme Court reversed the “Court of Appeals’
heightened pleading standard” in a unanimous opinion.254 The Court confirmed the
notice test for the factual specificity requirement announced in Conley and
explained that the complaint had met that requirement by detailing “the events
leading to his termination.”255 Most importantly, the Court rejected the argument
that the “conclusory allegation of discrimination” permitted the Court to affirm a
dismissal based on the implausibility of the plaintiff’s allegation: “Indeed it may
appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but
that is not the test.”256
There is no way to reconcile, as a matter of pleading standards, the Court’s
approach to the “conclusory allegations of discrimination” in Swierkiewicz and
Iqbal. Both involved conclusory allegations of discriminatory intent; in Iqbal, the
Court dismissed these allegations as implausible while in Swierkiewicz the Court
admonished the trial court for engaging in this same type of analysis. Many lower
courts and commentators have determined that Iqbal overruled the Swierkiewicz
case.257 This is a fair conclusion; the cases cannot be reconciled.
The problem with this understanding of Iqbal, however, is that the Court never
even mentioned Swierkiewicz in the Iqbal opinion. The Swierkiewicz decision
(along with Twombly) was the most relevant precedent to the Iqbal litigation.
Swierkiewicz was cited and discussed in the briefs submitted to the Court;258 yet, it
is not even mentioned once in the Iqbal opinion.259 This is a curious way to
overrule a case, if this is what the Court intended. And, although the Court has

251. Id. at 508–09.
252. Id. at 509.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 514–15.
255. Id. at 514.
256. Id. at 515 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
257. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009) (concluding that
Swierkiewicz was overruled by Iqbal); Seiner, supra note 152, at 193 (concluding that there
is “serious concern following Iqbal as to the validity of the Swierkiewicz decision,” and
citing numerous authors who have reached the same conclusion); Thomas, supra note 3, at
18 (explaining that “Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. effectively may be dead”). But see
Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404–06 (7th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the
Swierkiewicz decision is still valid after Iqbal).
258. See Brief for Respondent Javaid Iqbal at v, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)
(No. 07-1015) (citing to Swierkiewicz in “passim”); Brief for the Petitioners at VI, Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015) (citing to Swierkiewicz four times in the
brief).
259. See Swanson, 614 F.3d at 410 (noting that Swierkiewicz was not cited in the Iqbal
opinion).
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sometimes overruled previous cases in this passive manner, the usual course for the
Court is to directly confront precedent that is in conflict with the approach of the
Court in the case at bar.260
There is a better descriptive account of what happened in Iqbal: The Iqbal Court
did not mean to overrule Swierkiewicz, either directly or implicitly. Rather, the
Court was simply puzzled as to how to reconcile the Twombly decision with the
Swierkiewicz decision. The Twombly opinion, as discussed above, is written as if it
is consistent with every pleading case that had previously been decided by the
Court.261 And the Twombly opinion (unlike the Iqbal opinion) cites the
Swierkiewicz decision as if both are compatible;262 it even explicitly dismisses the
plaintiffs’ attempt to argue that the result in Twombly was inconsistent with
Swierkiewicz.263 But the Iqbal Court could not sort out how to reconcile these two
cases.
Indeed, the results in Twombly and Swierkiewicz cannot be reconciled if the
complaints in those cases are considered only from the perspective of whether they
included “conclusory allegations.” Using the massaged definition of conclusory
discussed above, the allegations in both Twombly and Swierkiewicz were
conclusory in the sense that they inferred one fact from the existence of other facts.
But Twombly’s allegation of an illegal antitrust conspiracy was determined to be
implausible, while Swierkiewicz’s allegation of discriminatory intent was allowed
to proceed to discovery. The Supreme Court even admonished the lower court in
Swierkiewicz for suggesting that a complaint should be dismissed on the grounds
that “recovery is very remote and unlikely.”264
Thus, by adopting the “conclusory” reading of Twombly, the Iqbal Court painted
itself into a corner. The allegation of discriminatory intent in Iqbal was
“conclusory,” as that term has been massaged in this Article. The allegation of
discriminatory intent in Swierkiewicz was also conclusory, as was the allegation of
an illegal antitrust conspiracy in Twombly. But the Court treated the conclusory
allegations in Swierkiewicz and Twombly dissimilarly. The Iqbal Court dealt with
this quandary by ignoring Swierkiewicz, discussing Twombly, and then proceeding
to the plausibility analysis.
If Twombly would have been interpreted according to the “transactional”
approach discussed above, however, the Iqbal Court would not have been in the
position of having to ignore either Twombly or Swierkiewicz. Under this reading of
Twombly, the Twombly and Swierkiewicz decisions can be reconciled; the resort to
plausibility in Twombly was necessary because the complaint failed to provide a
minimal amount of factual detail as to the transaction or event on which the

260. See Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory
Interpretation Methodology, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1875 (2008) (explaining that when the Court
overrules prior precedent the “norm is to conduct such doctrinal analysis explicitly” rather
than overruling the opinions “sub silentio”).
261. See supra text accompanying notes 142–44.
262. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 563 (2007) (citing Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)).
263. Id. 569–70.
264. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (quoting Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
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liability of the defendant was premised. The complaint in Swierkiewicz, however, is
materially different than the Twombly complaint under this metric. As the Court
noted in Swierkiewicz, the complaint in that case provided the basic details of the
event that formed the basis of the plaintiff’s complaint.265
Had the Court adopted the transactional reading of Twombly, then, it would not
have even reached the plausibility analysis in Iqbal. Because the allegation of
discriminatory intent in Iqbal, like the allegation of discriminatory intent in
Swierkiewicz, was made with all possible factual specificity, the Court would have
permitted the Iqbal plaintiffs to proceed to discovery like the plaintiffs in
Swierkiewicz. The “transactional” reading of Twombly, then, not only reconciles
Swierkiewicz with Twombly but also would have prevented the plausibility analysis
in Iqbal, thus avoiding the inconsistent results in Iqbal and Swierkiewicz.
Of course, this is not what occurred in Iqbal. The Iqbal Court clearly considered
Twombly’s “conclusory” allegations to be the impetus for the plausibility analysis
in that case.266 And because the Iqbal case also involved conclusory allegations, the
Court proceeded to plausibility in Iqbal267 despite the inconsistency of this result
with Swierkiewicz.
Going forward, the challenge is to sort out how this jumbled mess will, and
should, be resolved. The best, and easiest, fix to this problem is for the Iqbal case
to be overruled and for Twombly to be read according to the “transactional” method
discussed above.
First, reading Twombly according to the transactional theory discussed above is
both historically and analytically sound. As recounted earlier in this Article, civil
complaints in the United States have long been subject to a standard of factual
specificity.268 Reading Twombly as a case about factual specificity incorporates that
case into this history. Adopting the transactional understanding of Twombly
introduces a method for measuring factual specificity which is consistent with the
overall thrust of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which lean heavily on the
notion of a “transaction” or “occurrence”269) and which is analytically sound in the
sense that it accurately measures the factor under consideration.
Furthermore, from the perspective of Supreme Court precedent, it is a much
easier task to overrule the Iqbal decision than it would be to overrule the
Swierkiewicz decision. The Swierkiewicz decision cannot be easily isolated. If the
plausibility analysis is required every time there is a “conclusory” factual allegation
(under the assumed definition given to that term in order to avoid the circular
problem discussed above), the plausibility analysis would be necessary in every
case in which the defendant’s liability depends upon the subjective intent of the
defendant. As discussed above, a defendant’s state of mind is a fact that can only be

265. Id. at 514 (“Applying the relevant standard, petitioner’s complaint easily satisfied
the requirements of Rule 8(a) because it gives respondent fair notice of the basis for
petitioner’s claims. . . . His complaint detailed the events leading to his termination, provided
relevant dates, and included the ages and nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons
involved with his termination.”).
266. See supra text accompanying notes 184–96.
267. Id.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 35–57.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 168–78.

760

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 87:709

alleged by inference to other directly perceivable facts. Thousands, probably
millions, of complaints have been filed in federal court which rest on this premise.
Surely the Twombly Court did not mean to suggest that these complaints had been
incorrectly analyzed for all these decades if the plausibility of those allegations of
discriminatory intent were not considered by the district courts. This would be a
dramatic shift in pleading jurisprudence, and I am reluctant to believe that the
Court intended such a seismic shift.270
It is somewhat ironic that the Supreme Court’s initial pronouncement on the
pleading standards required for Rule 8, Conley v. Gibson, also involved an
allegation of discriminatory intent.271 Indeed, the factual specificity challenge made
to the complaint in Conley centered on the allegations of discriminatory intent
which were included in the complaint: “The [defendants] also argue that the
complaint failed to set forth specific facts to support its general allegations of
discrimination and that its dismissal is therefore proper.”272 The Conley Court
rejected this argument, and there is no indication that this decision was based on an
analysis of the plausibility of the discrimination allegations made in the complaint.
The Iqbal decision is not only inconsistent with Swierkiewicz; it runs afoul of
pleading cases that extend all the way back to Conley v. Gibson.
Overruling Iqbal is thus the much easier route by which to achieve consistency
within the Supreme Court’s case law. Moreover, there is no convincing argument
that the Iqbal Court’s interpretation of Rule 8 is superior to that represented in
previous Supreme Court case law. If the costs associated with litigation have
changed in the decades since the adoption of the Federal Rules, thus requiring a
reworking of the approach to pleading and discovery, the appropriate course for the
Court to take is a formal amendment to the Rules.273 The Rules Enabling Act gives
the Supreme Court the power “to prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure”274 and establishes a formal process for doing so.275 The Act does not,

270. Professor Marcus has previously expressed similar views regarding lower federal
court opinions which seem to anticipate the Supreme Court’s Iqbal decision:
The difficulties with scrutinizing factual conclusions become manifest in
connection with the frequent demand that the plaintiff proffer sufficient
supporting evidence to make conclusory [factual] allegations, particularly those
relating to state of mind, credible. In these cases . . . the court is not
affirmatively concluding that plaintiff’s charges are false, but only that they are
unsupported. Although the desire to insist on some underlying evidence is
natural, that exercise is materially different from the substantive scrutiny
described above. Requiring plaintiff to proffer supporting evidence at the
pleadings stage cannot be justified for several reasons.
Marcus, supra note 46, at 467–68 (footnote omitted).
271. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 43 (1957).
272. Id. at 47.
273. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 (1999) (“[W]e are bound to follow
Rule 23 as we understood it upon its adoption, and . . . we are not free to alter it except
through the process prescribed by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act.”); Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (“The text of a rule thus proposed and reviewed
limits judicial inventiveness. Courts are not free to amend a rule outside of the process
Congress ordered . . . .”).
274. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).
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however, give the Supreme Court the power to amend pleading practice “on the
fly” through judicial interpretation.276
E. The Irony of Conley (Properly Understood) and Iqbal
In the previous Part, it was noted that there is some irony to the fact that both
Iqbal and Conley involved allegations of discriminatory intent. I believe the irony
extends beyond the inconsistent treatment those allegations received at the
Supreme Court in those two cases. In Conley, the Court did not inquire whether the
allegation of discriminatory intent was plausible; in fact, the best interpretation of
the Conley opinion is that the Court thought the allegation of discriminatory intent
in the complaint was completely unnecessary.
Recall the conclusion reached earlier in this Article that Conley’s “no set of
facts” language anticipates that a complaint might be ambiguous regarding certain
facts that a plaintiff might ultimately have to prove at trial in order to recover from
the defendant, and that this ambiguity (or absence) is not fatal to the complaint.277
The “no set of facts” language directs a judge that she is to “fill the gaps” in the
story in a manner that is favorable to the plaintiff. If the notice standard for factual
specificity requires a defendant to give the “who, what, when, and where”
regarding the events or transactions on which the defendants’ liability is premised,
the Conley “no set of facts” language applies to facts that are not part of the “event
or transaction” of the suit but must nevertheless be proven at trial for a recovery to
occur. An allegation of a defendant’s mental state (such as a defendant’s
discriminatory intent) fits this description. A defendant’s mental state is a fact
question which will often be necessary for recovery, but it is not an “event or
transaction” falling under the transactional definition of “notice” developed in this
article. It is something that is internal to the defendant. As such, Conley can be read
for the proposition that an allegation of discriminatory intent (such as that involved
in cases such as Conley, Swierkiewicz, and Twombly) need not even be included in
a complaint to comply with the requirements of Rule 8.
I am not the only one who has reached this conclusion. In his notable book Civil
Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective Professor Robert Millar
engages in an enlightening discussion on whether the Federal Rules require a
factual allegation on each element of a cause of action.278 Professor Millar
eventually concludes that the best interpretation of the Rules is that it is
unnecessary to allege all of the elements of a cause of action so long as notice is
adequately given.279 In discussing the type of factual allegation which might be
omitted from a complaint but nevertheless satisfies the notice standard of factual
specificity, Professor Millar gives the example of a suit based on a dog-bite
incident in which the underlying substantive law requires that the plaintiff prove

275. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073–77 (2006).
276. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009
WIS. L. REV. 535, 546–60 (discussing the importance of adhering to the rule-making process
when considering alteration to the Federal Rules); Miller, supra note 5, at 84–90 (same).
277. See supra text accompanying notes 89–90.
278. MILLAR, supra note 24, at 190–94.
279. Id. at 193.
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that the defendant had knowledge of the dog’s propensity to bite.280 Professor
Millar concludes: “[I]f the third element, that of scienter, is omitted, is not the
defendant, nevertheless, reasonably informed of the nature of the claim?”281
Professor Millar might just as well have been referring to the Iqbal case.
When the Supreme Court pronounced the “no set of facts” language in Conley, I
believe the Court was writing from a perspective similar to Professor Millar’s. Of
course, Conley’s “no set of facts” language was “retired” in Twombly.282 My point
here, though, is not to argue that a plaintiff be allowed to proceed without even
alleging factual matters such as the defendants’ illegal scienter, even if that is the
best interpretation of the Conley opinion. Instead, my point here is to demonstrate
what a dramatic shift the Iqbal approach would be if it were to be controlling in the
future. Moving from a view that a plaintiff need not even allege discriminatory
intent to a view that a plaintiff must allege discriminatory intent, allege the
circumstantial evidence on which that conclusion is based, and convince a court
that this inferential evidence is “plausible” is extraordinary considering that these
interpretations are based on the exact same text of Rule 8.
F. Professor Steinman’s Effort to Justify Iqbal’s Interpretation of Twombly
Professor Steinman, in his article Plain Pleading, seems to implicitly understand
that there are problems with the Iqbal Court’s reliance on the existence of
conclusory allegations as the trigger for the plausibility analysis. Professor
Steinman attempts to avoid these difficulties by defining “conclusory” consistent
with the “transactional” theory of factual specificity advanced here.283 I doubt that
the term can be so stretched. This Article attempts to define “conclusory” as it is
commonly understood and used within legal circles. The heart of the concept is that
one fact is inferred from another. This analysis is, at base, different than whether an
event or transaction has been described with sufficient factual detail, as explained
above. The term “conclusory” simply has too much baggage for it to be employed
in the manner that Professor Steinman suggests. Attempting to resolve the problem
through word play will simply exacerbate the confusion that exists with regard to
pleading.
Apart from this problem of nomenclature (and probably in part because of this
problem), I believe that Professor Steinman also errs in explaining Iqbal as a case
that fails the “transactional” trigger for plausibility. According to Professor
Steinman: “The problem [in Iqbal] is not the cursory allegation of discriminatory
animus. The problem is the murkiness surrounding what Ashcroft and Mueller
actually did vis-à-vis Iqbal.”284 This reading of Iqbal is incorrect.
The complaint in Iqbal was specific about the transaction on which the
defendants’ liability was premised. As part of its post-9/11 investigation, the FBI
arrested thousands of Arab Muslim men.285 The plaintiff was one of them.286 Many

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id. at 190.
Id. at 190–91 (emphasis in original).
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560–63 (2007).
Steinman, supra note 5, at 1334–39.
Id. at 1336 (emphasis in original).
First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶ 47, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, 2004

2012]

TWOMBLY AND IQBAL

763

of these men (including the plaintiff) were designated as being of “high interest” to
the government investigation.287 Once these men were designated as being of “high
interest,” they were subject to a formal policy that required that they be held in
highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were “cleared.”288 This
formal policy was cleared by defendants Ashcroft and Mueller “in discussions in
the weeks after September 11, 2001.”289 The complaint alleged that the defendants
had approved this policy because of a discriminatory purpose.290
Granted, parsing this story from the numerous factual allegations contained in
the complaint requires some work, and maybe the complaint was not written as
succinctly as it could have been in order to avoid “murkiness.” The complaint,
however, was a vehicle by which multiple claims were asserted against, and by,
multiple parties.291 There was more at stake in the litigation than simply the claims
against Ashcroft and Mueller considered by the Supreme Court in the Iqbal
opinion. Because of the complex nature of the litigation, it is perhaps not surprising
that the narrative was not always chronological, a fact that seems to trouble
Professor Steinman.292
In any event, the Supreme Court has never adopted the position that an inartfully
drawn complaint should be dismissed for “murkiness.”293 The proper question is
whether the facts have been told with sufficient specificity. On this issue,
particularly if one assumes a transactional understanding of the factual specificity
required in a complaint, the Iqbal complaint was adequate. The circumstances
surrounding the plaintiff’s arrest and imprisonment were told in great detail.294 The
policy in which persons designated as “high interest” were held in restrictive
conditions of confinement was explained.295 The only part of this transactional
story arguably lacking in factual specificity was the factual allegation that Ashcroft
and Mueller had agreed to the restrictive confinement policy “in discussions in the
weeks after September 11, 2001.”296 But even here the complaint was much more
specific about Ashcroft and Mueller’s involvement in the restrictive confinement
policy than were the allegations in Twombly. Ashcroft and Mueller were
specifically identified; the manner in which this policy was adopted was identified
(“discussions”); and a very narrow time period (“weeks after September 11, 2001”)
WL 3756442 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004) (04 CV 1809 (JG)(JA)).
286. Id. at ¶ 48.
287. Id.
288. Id. at ¶¶ 53–64.
289. Id. at ¶ 69.
290. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 96, 198, 232, 235.
291. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 266 (pleading twenty-first cause of action); id. at ¶¶ 8–45 (listing
parties to the lawsuit).
292. See Steinman, supra note 5, at 1337 (noting that the description of events in the
complaint was not always chronological).
293. A complaint that is “vague or ambiguous” is potentially subject to a motion for a
more definite statement under Rule 12(e). See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e). But see Steinman, supra
note 5, at 1336 (concluding that the “murkiness” of the facts in the Iqbal complaint justify
the Court’s conclusion).
294. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 285, at ¶¶ 81–99, 111–26, 136–78, 187–
93.
295. Id. at ¶¶ 48–64.
296. Id. at ¶ 69.
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was identified. The Iqbal complaint was much more specific about Ashcroft and
Mueller’s involvement in the restrictive confinement policy than was Twombly’s
allegation of conspiracy, which did not detail how the alleged agreement was
reached, where it was done, by whom, and when.
Even more telling, however, was the focus of the plausibility analysis in Iqbal.
In Twombly, the allegation of agreement was not told with specificity, and the
Court proceeded to see if the circumstantial evidence “plausibly” suggested that an
agreement had occurred. In Iqbal, however, the Court did not consider whether
Ashcroft and Mueller had “plausibly” been involved with the adoption of the
restrictive confinement policy. Rather, the plausibility analysis was focused
specifically on whether Ashcroft and Mueller’s alleged involvement with the
restrictive confinement was based on discrimination:
To prevail . . . the complaint must contain facts plausibly showing that
petitioners purposefully adopted a policy of classifying postSeptember-11 detainees as “of high interest” because of their race,
religion, or national origin. . . . This the complaint fails to do. . . . [T]he
complaint does not show, or even intimate, that petitioners purposefully
housed detainees [in highly restrictive conditions] due to their race,
religion, or national origin. All it plausibly suggests is that the Nation’s
top law enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist
attack, sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions
available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity.297
If the Court had been concerned about the “murkiness surrounding what
Ashcroft and Mueller actually did vis-à-vis Iqbal,”298 as Professor Steinman
suggests, the plausibility analysis would have been applied to this question. Instead,
the plausibility analysis was applied to the question of the defendants’
discriminatory intent. Reading Iqbal in such a way that the problem is “not the
cursory allegation of discriminatory animus”299 is a nice way to minimize the Iqbal
decision and make it consistent with Swierkiewicz, but it is not faithful to the
analysis and language of the Iqbal opinion.
CONCLUSION
The Twombly and Iqbal cases have mostly been treated as a cohesive pair by
commentators and courts, but these two cases have divergent futures. Twombly will
eventually be recognized as a valuable case. The Twombly case, properly
understood, clarifies the factual specificity standard under Rule 8 and instructs
lower courts how to proceed when this standard is not met. Iqbal, however, will go
down as a hiccup. Perhaps it will be explained away on nonpleading grounds.300 Or,

297. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009).
298. Steinman, supra note 5, at 1336.
299. Id.
300. If the Court is inclined to limit the Iqbal decision to the specific facts of that case,
there are compelling reasons to do so. See id. at 1326 (describing Iqbal as a “rather
exceptional case[]” in the sense that it challenged the “efforts on behalf of the federal
government in response to, as the Court put it, ‘a national and international security
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perhaps it will be directly overruled. Regardless of the exact method of its
expiration, though, its shelf life is limited unless the Federal Rules are dramatically
rewritten or cases interpreting the Rules are overruled. There is no indication,
however, that the Supreme Court truly intended to signal this dramatic shift in
Iqbal. The better interpretation of Iqbal is that the Court was simply confused as to
what had occurred in Twombly. Once this confusion is sorted out, however, the
Court will turn its back on the Iqbal decision.

emergency unprecedented in the history of the American Republic’”).

